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Abstract 
This study seeks to understand the causes and nature of xenophobia in South Africa. It 
investigates this through the case of De Doorns, where in November 2009 3000 
Zimbabweans were chased out of their homes, which were subsequently looted and 
destroyed. This case was chosen because it is an example of a xenophobic incident 
that went beyond xenophobic attitudes to manifest in violent behaviour towards 
African migrants.  
The study was guided though three questions. (1) How can the violent 
xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained? (2) Do the explanations for 
xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of xenophobia in De 
Doorns? (3) Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns? To answer the 
first and third questions key informant interviews with relevant organisations were 
conducted with Agri Wes-Cape, the Hex River Valley Table Grape Association and 
People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP). In addition, published 
work (reports and an article) has been analysed. To answer the second question, 
literature on the topic of xenophobia was reviewed and the findings compared to the 
answers found for the first question. 
The key findings in this study were, firstly, that the causes for xenophobia 
were twofold: there was a context and there were underlying causes; in addition there 
were specific triggers for the xenophobia. This twofold explanation is evident in 
Horowitz’s ethnic violence theory, where he takes into consideration both external 
contextual causes and immediate locality-bound causes. The context was the farming 
community of De Doorns, characterised by casual work, job insecurity and (often) 
poor living conditions. The underlying causes were found to be locals’ frustration 
with and perceptions of Zimbabweans; this led to the development of xenophobic 
attitudes. In addition, labour brokers were found to have worsened the situation by 
encouraging causal work and by skimming off workers’ payments. Government 
insufficiencies were also an underlying condition: there was lack in an early warning 
system and there were service delivery failures. These underlying conditions gave a 
breeding ground for the triggers of the violence to operate. These triggers were found 
to be of a local political character, and these highlighted the explanatory value of 
Misago’s micropolitics theory. A local councillor stirred up the xenophobia to gain 
popularity for re-election before the upcoming local government elections. From this 
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it is found that with similar or worse underlying condition xenophobia could flourish, 
given the ‘right’ triggers. This is an important finding in light of the up coming local 
government elections in 2016. In terms of the nature of the xenophobia in South 
Africa, it is argued that this often goes beyond the expression of xenophobic attitudes, 
and takes the form of violent xenophobic behaviour which is usually targeted at black 
African migrants. Explanations for this violence have historical roots in the armed 
struggle and it illicits a response from government. Why black Africans? Their 
proximity and their vulnerability are put forward as explanations, though it is also 
recognized that current explanations are insufficient.  
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iv 
Opsomming 
Hierdie studie se oogmerk is om die oorsake en aard van xenofobie in Suid-Afrika te 
verstaan. Dit word ondersoek deur die geval van De Doorns, waartydens November 
2009 3000 Zimbabwiërs uit hul huise gejaag is wat geplunder en vernietig is. Hierdie 
geval is gekies omdat dit ‘n voorbeeld van ‘n xenofobiese geval is wat verder as die 
xenofobiese houdings gegaan het om in gewelddadige gedrag teenoor immigrante uit 
Afrika te manifesteer.  
Die studie is deur drie vrae gelei: (1) Hoe kan die gewelddadige xenofobiese 
aanvalle in De Doorns verduidelik word? (2) Bied die verduidelikings vir xenofobie 
genoegsame verduideliking vir die oorsake en aard van xenofobie in De Doorns? (3) 
Is die oorsake van xenofobie steeds sigbaar in De Doorns? Om die eerste en derde 
vrae te beantwoord is sleutel informante onderhoude met relevante organisasies 
gevoer naamlik Agri Wes-Kaap, Die Hexriviervallei Tafeldruif Vereniging en People 
Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP). Daarby is gepubliseerde werk 
(verslae en ‘n artikel) ook ontleed. Om die tweede vraag te beantwoord is literatuur 
oor die onderwerp van xenofobie hersien en die bevindinge vergelyk met die 
antwoorde op die eerste vraag.  
Die sleutel bevindings in hierdie studie was eerstens dat die oorsake vir 
xenofobie tweeledig was: daar was ‘n konteks en onderliggende oorsake; daar was 
ook bykomende snellers vir die xenofobie. Hierdie tweeledige verduideliking is 
duidelik in Horowitz se etniese geweldsteorie, waar hy beide eksterne kontekstuele 
oorsake en onmiddelike ligging-gebonde oorsake. Die konteks was die 
plaasgemeenskap van De Doorns wat gekenmerk is deur informele werk, 
werksonsekerheid, en (dikwels) swak lewensomstandighede. Hierdie onderliggende 
oorsake is bevind om die plaaslike inwoners se frustrasie met en siening van 
Zimbabwiërs te wees; dit het aanleiding gegee tot xenofobiese houdings. Daar is 
verder gevind dat arbeidsmakelaars die situasie vererger het deur die aanmoediging 
van informele werk en die afskeer van werkers se betalings. Regeringstekortkominge 
was ook ‘n onderliggende oorsaak: daar was ‘n gebrek aan ‘n vroeë 
waarskuwingstelsel terwyl diensverskaffing ook misluk het. Hierdie onderliggende 
toestande het ‘n broeiplek aan die snellers van die geweld gegee om te funksioneer. 
Daar is bevind dat die snellers ‘n plaaslike politieke karakter gehad het en beklemtoon 
die verklarende waarde van Misago se mikro-politieke teorie. ‘n Plaaslike raadslid het 
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die xenofobie aangewakker om gewildheid te verwerf vir herverkiesing voor die 
toekomstige plaaslike verkiesings.  Vanuit hierdie is daar bevind dat xenofobie met 
soortgelyke of erger onderliggende toestande kan floreer, met die ‘regte’ snellers. Dit 
is ‘n belangrike bevinding in die lig van die toekomstige plaaslike 
regeringsverkiesings in 2016. In terme van die aard van xenofobie in Suid-Afrika 
word daar gearguenteer dat dit dikwels verder gaan as die uitdrukking van 
xenofobiese houdings en die vorm neem van gewelddadige xenofobiese gedrag wat 
dikwels op swart immigrante van Afrika gemik is. Verklarings vir hierdie geweld het 
geskiedkundige oorsake in die gewapende stryd en ontlok ‘n reaksie van die regering. 
Hoekom swart Afrikane? Hulle nabyheid en kwesbaarheid word aangebied as 
verklarings terwyl dit egter ook herken word dat huidige verklarings onvoldoende is. 
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1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“All good people agree, 
And all good people say, 
All nice people, like Us, are We 
And every one else is They: 
But if you cross over the sea, 
Instead of over the way, 
You may end by (think of it!) looking on We 
As only a sort of They!”  
! Rudyard Kipling, Debits and Credits 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Fear of the unknown is something one can witness all over the world, and as the 
movement of people has accelerated with new technologies of transport and 
communication so has the fear of strangers. This fear of strangers is what we call 
xenophobia. It derives from two Greek words: xénos and phóbos, meaning ‘stranger’ 
or ‘guest’ and ‘fear’, respectively. Consequently xenophobia means fear of the guest 
or the stranger, though today it has the stronger meaning of hatred of strangers. The 
South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) defines xenophobia as “the deep 
dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state” (in Bekker 2010: 127). It is 
important to bear in mind that xenophobia is more than just an attitude towards 
foreigners; it can also take shape as a practice. This practice could again turn into 
violent behaviour (Harris 2002).  
The end of the isolating apartheid regime in South Africa opened the borders 
to many new migrants. This also increased the potential for xenophobia, and it has 
been a problem in South Africa ever since. Xenophobia in South Africa is expressed 
as negative attitudes towards immigrants, but also it occurs in xenophobic practices 
such as discrimination, exploitation and violence. There have been several studies on 
xenophobia, as the literature review will show in the next chapter, but not enough has 
been done to curb these attitudes and practices. This thesis will look at the 
explanations and the nature of xenophobia in South Africa. The purpose is to 
understand the reasons for the attitudes and practices of xenophobia in the country. 
This is an important topic to investigate, as xenophobia is something that happens in 
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South Africa on a regular basis, and it violates the South African Constitution, that 
bases itself on human rights.  
Because this is a Master’s thesis with limited time and resources the 
xenophobic events in De Doorns in November 2009 will serve as a case study. De 
Doorns has been selected in part because of its proximity to the researcher’s 
University, and because it is an example of a xenophobic incident which went beyond 
xenophobic attitudes and turned into violent behaviour.   
 
1.2 Background 
This section on background gives an idea of the severity of xenophobia in South 
Africa. As stated above, since South Africa’s independence xenophobia has grown, 
along with the rising number of foreigners coming into the country. Foreigners in this 
country have been harassed, attacked and even killed. The attitudes towards 
immigrants held by sections of the South African population have become more 
hostile. The attitude of hatred towards foreigners is especially held against people 
coming from other African countries (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). A Southern 
African Migration Project (SAMP) survey from 2001 shows that 21 per cent of the 
respondents wanted a complete ban on immigration, while 64 per cent wanted strict 
limits on entry (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). Xenophobia runs deep in South Africa 
and goes beyond the fear and dislike of foreigners, since even fellow citizens have 
been attacked. This indicates that the fear of the ‘other’ in this country is extreme and 
may express itself in violent behaviour (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). 
A number of xenophobic events have taken place since independence. In 1998 
the police set dogs on three Mozambicans in Johannesburg in a gruesome training 
session; the event was captured on video and the policemen were tried in court. The 
video shows the three foreign men pleading for help while the policemen stand by 
laughing. It became known that it was ‘normal procedure’ to set dogs on criminals or 
foreigners in order to train the dogs to bite. These groups of people were chosen as 
targets because they were least likely to complain. Johannes Niemand, a former dog 
handler, told the court: “It was a pity that the video was taken. Because of that video 
the whole matter has been blown out of perspective” (CNN 2001).  
In another xenophobic incident in 1998, three foreigners lost their lives on a 
train in Pretoria. While the men were being harassed by an angry mob, one of the 
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three jumped or was pushed off the train to his death, while the other two were 
electrocuted by the power lines as they were trying to get to safety (Zvomuya 2013).  
In May/June 2008 South Africa experienced two weeks of violence which left 
62 people dead, 21 of them South African citizens, over 100 000 people displaced and 
1 300 people arrested (Monson & Arian 2011: 26). Mozambican Ernesto Nhamuave, 
who became an awful symbol of the violence, was burnt alive in Ramaphosaville on 
the East Rand (Zvomuya 2013). Perpetrators stole millions of rands worth of goods 
and destroyed homes. Those especially targeted were foreigners, people married to 
foreigners, anyone who refused to participate, and those who belonged to groups that 
were unable to ‘justify’ their claim to their piece of urban land (Landau 2011: 1). The 
government claimed that this violence was random acts of criminality, but the 
violence was specifically targeted at people who were believed to be a threat to South 
Africa (Landau 2011: 1). These events are the focus of much of the literature written 
on xenophobia in South Africa (For example; Landau ed. 2011 and Hassim, Kupe & 
Worby eds. 2008). However the violence did not end in 2008 as dozens have been 
killed since then (Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) 
2011: 56). 
In the aftermath of the World Cup in 2010, when hundreds of thousand fans 
visited the country from around the world for this global feast, threatening pamphlets 
were distributed and foreigners were told that they must leave their communities and 
the country (Landau 2011: 22).  
In 2013 Emidio Marcia died in police custody after being handcuffed and 
dragged behind a police van. The Mozambican taxi-driver had parked on the wrong 
side of the road, and he resisted being arrested. Although this also was captured on 
tape and broadcast around the world, the police’s initial response was one of denial 
(Zvomuya 2013). Also in 2013, violence against foreigners broke out in the Eastern 
Cape in communities around Port Elizabeth after a 19-year-old South African was 
shot to death, allegedly by a Somali immigrant (SABC 2013).  
These examples show that xenophobia can and often does become violent in 
nature in South Africa. One must not, however, forget that xenophobia also takes less 
extreme forms and often affects the daily life of foreigners. The xenophobic events 
that are the focus of this case study took place in De Doorns. De Doorns is a small 
rural town in the Western Cape, which mainly produces table-grapes. On the 15th and 
17th of November 2009 the Zimbabwean community was forcefully chased from the 
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informal settlement, and as the Zimbabweans fled, their homes were torn down, 
burned and destroyed. This led to 3000 people being displaced, and living either on 
the farms of their employers or at the shelter erected on the local rugby field (Kerr & 
Durrheim 2013: 583-584). These events will be presented and explored further in 
Chapters 3 and 4. The explanations as to why these people were targeted at this time 
are the focus of this thesis.  
 
1.3 Preliminary literature study 
The literature survey for this thesis involves several different disciplines. The 
literature on xenophobia includes the fields of sociology, anthropology, migration 
studies and political science. These fields propose different explanations for the 
presence and severity of xenophobic attitudes and practices in South Africa, but it is 
noteworthy that these explanations do not mutually exclude each other. The literature 
review will be divided into two sections: the explanations for xenophobia and the 
nature of xenophobia, although the first section is much bigger.  
The explanations have been placed into three different groupings. The first 
grouping consists of socio-cultural explanations. Here we find social identity theory, 
which focuses on a person’s self-image; this derives from the social group(s) that the 
individual believes himself/herself to belong to (Tajfel & Turner 1979:40). As most 
individuals want to maintain or even enhance their self-image, it is important that the 
‘membership’ of their group is perceived as something positive. In turn this leads to a 
need to reject and even express hostility towards the out-group. When this translates 
into nationalism it becomes a way of promoting one’s status as a citizen; this therefore 
also rejects the foreigner. When a country is going through a political transition, as 
South Africa has been doing for the last 20 years, nationalism can take the form of  
hostility towards foreigners and this provides an explanation for xenophobia 
(Mummendey, Klink & Brown 2001:159-160).  
This grouping also includes the bio-cultural hypothesis, which explains why it 
is that black Africans that are the most frequently targeted group for xenophobia. 
Furthermore, this grouping includes an explanation of inherited culture. Throughout 
the history of Sourth Africa the mobility of people has been controlled. In the book 
Exorcising the Demons Within (ed. Landau 2011) the authors examined the issue of 
mobility and found that mobility was perceived as a threat to the insider community; 
they found that geographical and cultural belonging have been factors that determine 
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one’s usefulness and citizenship. The enclosed, isolated nature of apartheid society 
dictated where one should live on the basis of skin colour and created a society that 
was unable to deal with strangers (Harris 2002). The stress created by this can be 
overwhelming and it is argued that this can lead to xenophobia. 
 The second grouping includes structural explanations. In this group we have 
the relative deprivation theory, the theory of ethnic violence and the group threat 
theory. Relative deprivation theory suggests that social unrest comes from the 
perception that one gets less than one is entitled to (Harris 2002). This can create 
xenophobic attitudes and practices if the reason for this deficit is believed to be 
foreigners. It is seen as a zero-sum game where foreigners that have jobs are blamed 
for unemployment among South Africans (du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 163). In other 
words the foreigners become ‘frustration scapegoats’ and this is why xenophobia 
occurs (Harris 2002). The theory of ethnic violence by Horowitz (2001), states that 
external contextual causes in addition to immediate locallity-bound causes must be 
taken into account when looking at violent outbursts. This theory also gives a step-by-
step description of how an violent ethnic event will unfold (du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 
160-161). It points to causes that were present  in South Africa prior to major 
xenophobic events, and therefore explains what caused these events to take place, thus 
providing an explanation for xenophobia in the country. Group threat theory suggests 
that inter-group hostility is largely a reaction to perceived threats from subordinate 
group(s). If the dominant group finds that its position vis-à-vis the minority group is 
in jeopardy and fears that it might lose its advantaged social position, hostility can 
arise (King 2007: 1225) 
 The third grouping comprises institutional explanations. This grouping 
consists of the role of the state. Attitudes and statements from state representatives 
where they deny xenophobia, or lay blame for crime on foreigners, could generate 
xenophobia (Bekker 2010:126). There is also the belief that the government is not 
doing enough to solve the ‘problem’ of immigrants (Landau 2011: 13). One can also 
look at the policies that affect migration into the country. There is a big gap between 
policy and practice in South Africa, and this also worsens the xenophobic 
phenomenon (Bekker 2010: 141), this will be disucssed later. Furthermore Misago 
(2011) argues that a key trigger for violence against foreign nationals and outsiders in 
specific locations is localised competition for political and economic power. In 
addition mistreatment of foreigners by border control officials, by the police and by 
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detention centres has led to a norm where foreigners receive xenophobic treatment. 
This also reinforces xenophobia in South Africa (SAHRC 2006: 32; 35). The way the 
many branches of the state behave when it comes to foreigners creates and reinforces 
xenophobia in South Africa.  
  This leads us to the nature, with this I mean the observable features and 
qualities of xenophobia. Xenophobic attitudes tend, in some circumstances, to become 
violent and are directed predominantly at black migrants. Some argue that the nature 
is the real problem and that xenophobia is labelled a pathology to ‘hide’ the violence 
that is inherent in South African society (Harris 2002). Why is it that xenophobic 
attitudes often turn into violent behaviour? Xenophobia is not diminishing in South 
Africa, and this highlights the need to investigate the causes and to reverse this trend. 
Chapter 2 will examine these explanations in more detail.  
 
1.4 Research Problem and questions 
The South African Constitution is one of the world’s most liberal and it has 
incorporated the human rights defined by the United Nations into its Bill of Rights in 
Chapter 2, for example everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law and the right to life in accordance with the Bill of 
Rights. In fact the Constitution protects all people within the borders of South Africa, 
guaranteeing basic human and legal rights to everyone living in South Africa 
(Preamble to the South African Constitution 1996). This is something that xenophobia 
violates, as people are targeted on the basis of their countries of origin. Xenophobia is 
ongoing, and is not decreasing; this leads to the need to understand its causes. It is the 
intention of this thesis to explore whether the current explanations are sufficient to 
explain the xenophobia that occurred in De Doorns. In addition to examining the 
causes of xenophobia, the nature of xenophobia will also be examined. Here it is 
important to try to explain why it is largely black Africans that are the targets of this 
xenophobic violence. The theoretical section of the research presents the current 
literature on the explanations for xenophobia and on the violent nature of xenophobia 
in South Africa. This provides the foundation for the research questions that follow. 
De Doorns, as the case study, was chosen as it exemplifies the nature of xenophobia 
in South Africa: it was violent (homes were looted and destroyed, people were 
threatened unless they left) and it was targeted at black migrants (Zimbabweans). The 
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empirical research for this thesis is limited to the case of De Doorns in the Western 
Cape. This leads to the first research question: 
 
How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained? 
 
The theories on xenophobia which will be presented in Chapter 2 will be assessed in 
terms of the empirical research conducted, to see if they help to explain the 
xenophobic events that took place in De Doorns in November 2009. Thus the next 
research question is: 
 
Do the explanations for xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes 
and nature of xenophobia in De Doorns? 
 
It will also be interesting to see if the causes of the events in 2009 are still evident in 
the community in De Doorns today: is xenophobia still present and is it as explosive 
as it was in November 2009? This leads to a subsequent question: 
 
 Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns? 
 
Although conducting this study as a case study limits the explanatory reach of this 
thesis, this smaller case study is necessary, given the limits in terms of both resources 
and time.  
 
1.5 Research Design and Method  
For this thesis the research design that has been chosen is that of a qualitative single 
case study. This is chosen to conduct a descriptive and exploratory study of 
xenophobia in De Doorns. I will tackle the research question by doing text-analysis of 
reports and of an article previously written on the xenophobia at De Doorns. In 
addition I will conduct key informant interviews with members of relevant 
organizations to get an insight into how they see the xenophobic events of 2009, and 
to see if the causal factors I found in the reports and studies are there still. This will be 
interesting to see because if the explanation(s) found in the literature is/are still 
prevalent, one could expect to see xenophobia currently and in the future.  
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 In this study I hope to put forward explanations for the nature of xenophobia 
in South Africa, and to test these against the events in De Doorns. A qualitative study 
is chosen because I am only looking at one case and I am examining this case in-
depth. In addition a qualitative study goes together with key informant interviews, 
which is one of my chosen methods. A larger study with, for example, surveys, or a 
study of several cases, would be too expensive and too comprehensive (Burnham, 
Lutz & Layton-Henry 2008: 40).  
A major weakness of the text-analysis and key informant interviews about De 
Doorns is that it will be difficult to generalize these findings to the rest of South 
Africa (Burnham, Lutz & Layton-Henry 2008: 64). To be able to generalize, more 
towns, both rural and urban, would have to be researched. However I am locating it in 
the broader research of xenophobia in South Africa. The case study will be used to 
validate or not what the current body of research explains. Furthermore, the research 
design and methods will yield valid answers to my chosen research questions and can 
help to shed further light on the explanatory value of current theories and explanations 
of xenophobia in South Africa. In addition, using text-analysis and key informant 
interviews enhances the study’s reliability, as if one repeats the research the results 
should not differ greatly (Burnham, Lutz & Layton-Henry 2008: 39).  
 I have conducted key informant interviews with organizations that have 
interests in De Doorns. I have chosen to interview representatives from Agri Wes-
Cape, the Hex River Valley Table Grapes Association (HTA) and People Against 
Suffering Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP). The three different organizations will 
be briefly introduced to demonstrate the relevance of their input. Agri Wes-Cape is an 
organization for the agricultural sector in the Western Cape. This organization is a 
mouthpiece for the farmers and promotes their interests. Agri Wes-Cape condemned 
the xenophobic attacks in De Doorns and openly gave their opinion of the reasons for 
the attack in 2009; they also expressed an opinion on what should be done (Kerr & 
Durrheim 2013: 594). This tells us that they played an active role prior to and in the 
aftermath of the xenophobic events in De Doorns; this makes them an interesting role 
player to interview. 
The HTA is also a body that represents farmers, though this is a more local 
body; it represents the grape farmers in and around De Doorns (Robb & Davis 2009: 
14). They had a role to play in the opening of a satellite Refugee Reception Office in 
De Doorns to accommodate the many Zimbabweans that were working as seasonal 
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workers (Robb & Davis 2009: 19-20). This association was also outraged by the 
xenophobic attacks in 2009. It is clear that they have a strong interest in De Doorns 
and particularly in the workers there, both permanent and seasonal. 
The third association has a different stance. PASSOP is a “not-for-profit” 
human rights organization devoted to fighting for the rights of asylum-seekers, 
refugees and immigrants in South Africa” (PASSOP 2014a). They were the first 
organization on site after the mass displacement of the 17th of November 2009, and 
have since played a major role in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camp and for 
the displaced peoples (PASSOP 2010).  Their role has in other words been very 
extensive both during and in the aftermath of the xenophobic events in De Doorns. 
They will provide a different perspective than that provided by the two organizations 
named above, as they will ‘represent’ the perspective of the foreigners in these events.  
The difficulty here is of course that these organizations may answer the 
questions in a way that will make them look good. Nevertheless because of the limited 
time for this research project and in view of the difficulty of conducting interviews 
with the inhabitants of the De Doorns (given the security and language barriers) this 
option of conducting interviews with the inhabitants has been ruled out. This therefore 
left the possibility of interviewing key informants. The interviews were conducted as 
semi-structured interviews with open formatted questions. These semi-structured 
interviews are effective when it comes to sensitive topics like xenophobia, where 
views can be explored further, in more detail. The downside is that one needs to be an 
effective interviewer: one has to take care and consider the questions thoroughly, and 
this can take a lot of time to set up and to analyze. This is especially true in a case, 
where the sample size is small and the interviews could be difficult to set up 
(Burnham, Lutz & Layton-Henry 2008: 240-241).  
 The case of De Doorns was chosen for several reasons. A logistical reason was 
its proximity to the home University of the author. Another was that there has been 
quite  substantial coverage of the events in November 2009, so that text-analysis was 
possible. However the main reason for its choice was that this was a major 
xenophobic event that seemed to shock South Africa. It was not merely an isolated 
event in a small rural town; it was evidence of the pervasive nature  of xenophobia in 
South Africa (Robb & Davis 2009: 10).  Although it is difficult to generalize the 
findings from De Doorns to the rest of South Africa, De Doorns is an example of what 
could happen in other places in the nation.  
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1.6 Ethical considerations 
The study will be conducted in line with professional ethical codes for social science 
research and the ‘Framework policy for the assurance and promotion of ethically 
accountable research at Stellenbosch University’. The goals of the research will be 
stated and made clear to the key informant respondents before the interviews 
commence. In addition a written consent form will be given and signed. The 
respondents will participate without receiving any financial compensation.  The 
names of the respondents will be kept anonymous if they so wish. To ensure privacy 
and confidentiality the collected data will be kept on a password-secure computer, 
which only the researcher has access to. Finally all the sources of information will be 
duly acknowledged and referenced.  
 
1.7 Outline of chapters  
This thesis will have five chapters, including this chapter.  
 The second chapter will provid a literature review of the explanations given 
for xenophobia. The aim is to see to what degree the explanations (which were 
described above) are able to account for xenophobia in South Africa. This review will 
show the areas that must be explored in this case study. Chapter 2  will provid as a 
more detailed introduction to the topic of xenophobia in South Africa, including the 
nature of the attitudes and practices associated with this phenomenon. 
 Chapter 3 will give an overview of De Doorns as a society. This chapter will 
describe the composition of the town’s wards, its social economy, its service delivery, 
the extent and nature of employment, etc. This chapter explores the situation of De 
Doorns to provide a context for this study.  Furthermore, the xenophobic events of 
November 2009 will also be presented in this chapter. 
In Chapter 4 the case of De Doorns will be analyzed through text-analysis and 
key informant interviews to find answers to the research questions: How can the 
violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained? Do the explanations for 
xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of xenophobia in De 
Doorns? Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns? This chapter will 
show whether the analysis and interviews confirm the explanations offered in chapter 
two. If not, are there other explanations? 
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 The final chapter will conclude this thesis with an overview of the research 
conducted in the previous chapters in relation to the research questions. This chapter 
will point to the relevance of this study to xenophobia in South Africa. It will also 
suggest areas that need further study.  
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Chapter 2: Overview of Explanations of Xenophobia in 
South Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will serve as a review of the existing explanations for xenophobia in 
South Africa found in the literature. This review will also suggest what I should look 
for when looking at the case of De Doorns. From the review a more detailed picture of 
xenophobia in South Africa can be painted. This chapter will also give an overview of 
the nature of xenophobia. This refers to the manifestations and features of 
xenophobia, in terms of attitudes and behaviour.  
 The explanations can be divided into three different groupings: socio-cultural, 
structural and institutional explanations. These groupings will be put forth in 
sequence, and through them much will be revealed regarding attitudes and practices in 
the course of presenting the explanations. The nature of xenophobia will also be 
discussed. Finally there will be a short analysis of the literature review.  
It is important to bear in mind that the existing literature on xenophobia in 
South Africa is of an interdisciplinary nature, and includes perspectives drawn from 
sociology, anthropology, migration studies and political science. In other words it is a 
vast field. It should also be kept in mind that the different explanations are not 
mutually exclusive.  
 
2.2 Socio-cultural explanations 
This grouping looks at explanations that lean on social and cultural factors to explain 
the xenophobia occurring in South Africa.  
 
2.2.1 Social identity theory 
Social identity theory, in simple terms, looks at “the aspects of an individual’s self-
image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself belonging” 
(Tajfel & Turner 1979: 40). Two common assumptions in the theory are that 
individuals strive to maintain or enhance their self-esteem, and that social groups and 
membership of these groups are associated with negative and positive feelings. People 
like to think positively about the group to which they feel they belong. One way of 
being positive about your in-group is through nationalism. Within a nationalist 
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framework, one’s positive feelings towards one’s national in-group can also entail 
rejection of and hostility towards the out-group (Mummendey, Klink & Brown 
2001:159-160). This rejection of the out-group can be seen as particularly strong in 
South Africa where the in-group is not an obvious group because there are many 
different languages and peoples in South Africa. The relationship between social 
identity and nationalism can therefore be explored as an explanation of the source of 
xenophobia.  
Former president Thabo Mbeki stated that “What happened during these days 
(May 2008) was not inspired by a perverse nationalism” and that as “Africans we will 
never become enemies of other Africans” (Mbeki 2008). Though nationalism has 
been a building block in post-apartheid times when the ‘rainbow nation’ was 
beginning its consolidation, it can be seen as contributing to in-group thinking, in that 
it nurtures the view that one’s own nation is superior to other nations and therefore it 
should be dominant. Consequently nationalism is inherently linked to out-group 
derogation (Mummendey, Klink & Brown 2001: 160). Hence it is possible that this 
constructed nationalism has contributed to the hatred of people who fall outside of the 
boundaries of this nationalism. Sally Peberdy (2009: 171) argues that “language and 
images of immigration discourses and their practices reveal whom the state sees as 
desirable and undesirable new members of the nation, and thus how it constructs 
national identity”. Furthermore, she says that to understand the immigration policy of 
a nation, one must look at economic, structural, social and political factors in that 
country, but to truly understand the policy, one must also look at how the state 
imagines its national identity and nation-building project – its national vision 
(Peberdy 2009: 171).  
The nation-building project becomes highly visible during times of political 
transition. South Africa has gone through many political transitions, the latest being in 
1994 when it became a democracy. Much of the immigration policy was inherited 
from the previous regime, but the policy was not left completely unchanged. The new 
state reshapes its immigration policy to serve the ends of the country, so that the new 
policy delineates anew who are insiders and who are outsiders. This is reflected in the 
prioritization of those the state wants on the inside, and the exclusion of those it feels 
are a threat to the nation and therefore should be kept on the outside. Who is 
considered to be a threat has changed throughout South African history: in the 1990s 
and 2000s this threat was identified by the policy as both documented and 
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undocumented migrants and immigrants, and especially other Africans (Peberdy 
2009:172). Peberdy suggests that when democratic South Africa starts to feel less 
threatened by its own internal divisions and inequalities, the restrictions in the 
immigration policy could become more relaxed (Peberdy 2009:172-173). The major 
transition in 1994 redefined what it meant to be a South African; this no longer came 
down to the primordial signifiers of ‘race’, religion, culture or skin-color, but was 
based more on nationality and citizenship (Peberdy 2009: 177-8). This citizenship is 
based on indigeneity. Citizenship is granted on the basis of territory and birth, not 
political agency, and it is emphasized by state power. This is an exclusive concept of 
nationality, as those believed to be on the outside of the territorial boundaries are 
excluded from the rights and entitlements of citizenship (Neocosmos 2006: 16). To be 
a South African national after 1994 meant having a shared history, built on a 
foundation of democratic values, human rights and development. The ‘new’ South 
Africa came with the legacy of the inequality of apartheid in the economic, political 
and social arenas, and the nation-building project focuses on transforming these areas 
of inequality – for all of its citizens. Non-nationals are excluded from the benefits that 
nationals can claim, although these benefits may also be inadequate for many citizens. 
The inability, or unwillingness, to protect the rights of non-citizens also contradicts 
the new focus of South Africa and its liberal constitution (Peberdy 2009: 178). The 
treatment of foreigners contradicts the human rights notions embodied in the Bill of 
Rights in the South African Constitution (Peberdy 2009: 177-8). 
The narrative of South African immigration policy is filled with 
anthropomorphological metaphors and metaphors about the contamination of nation, 
about nationalism and about immigration. For example, immigrants today are seen as 
carriers of disease and also as potsential contaminats of the body politic of the nation 
by derailing the development and redistribution process and through criminal 
behaviour (Peberdy 2009: 178.180). So, in addition to the changes in policy, we can 
look to the language and imagery used to explain the way the nation and immigrants 
are seen. This type of language can both justify a current policy and help to secure the 
adoption of new policies.  An argument that is often transmitted through language 
about immigration is that foreigners are a (perceived) threat to the national identity. 
The foreigners threaten the health of the South African body politic (the nation) and 
the state is extraordinarily vigilant in protecting this health (Peberdy 2009: 178-9). 
Immigrants are talked about as carriers of disease that can destroy the physical and 
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metaphysical South African nation; they can derail development, retard the 
redistributive process and increase criminality – in other words, destroy the 
foundation of the nation-state (Peberdy 2009: 180). It is an easy way out to blame 
foreigners for derailing the progress of the South African national project as long as 
the aims of the Constitution and thereby also of nationalism are not met. 
Landau feels that the debates about xenophobia, which claim that the attacks 
are about an over-zealous nationalism and not a ‘fear of strangers’ as such are 
mistaken (Landau 2011:6). He (2008: 114) believes that in the aftermath of May 2008 
we will see an increase of cosmopolitanism entering into the ethical basis of 
nationalism among the middle class and among government officials, though this is 
not the case for the whole population (as the attacks have shown us). Many South 
Africans hold on to the notion of the territorial project, where the country should 
preferably become an exclusively South African domain. These attacks have given 
xenophobia the same status as racism, homophobia and sexism, and so people may 
hesitate to speak in overtly nationalistic terms. Furthermore, Landau (2008:114) 
argues that this possible change in nationalistic attitudes can make the notion that 
South Africa belongs to all that live here more acceptable, despite some people’s wish 
for stricter restrictions on who gets to live here (Landau 2008: 114). Building up a 
nation and nationalism is about creating cohesion and belonging, and this is done by 
way of contrast to something that is different – in other words, other nationalities. If 
nationalism were to be constructed without comparison to something different, there 
would be no reason to develop nationalism in the first place. Thus, in a hostile climate 
a strong nationalism that is still under construction can become a driving force for 
xenophobia. 
 
2.2.2 Bio-cultural hypothesis 
The term ‘foreigner’ is generally treated as if it referred to one homogenous group, 
though this does not explain why this anger and violence is directed mostly at black 
African foreigners, who become scapegoats. The bio-cultural hypothesis has an 
explanation for this: these foreigners are targeted because they are easy to spot (Harris 
2002). In other words foreigners are targeted on the grounds of observable traits, as 
was the case during apartheid. For example, Morris (1998: 1125) writes that 
Congolese and Nigerians are targeted because they are easy to identify because of 
their language, physical features, their bearing, clothing and hairstyle and their 
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inability to speak an African South Africa language. The police also practise this 
stereotyping in their work to try to establish wheter a suspect is an illegal or not 
(Harris 2008). These observable primordial signifiers are central in explaining 
xenophobic acts. But what these signifiers mean and how they acquire meaning are 
not explained by the hypothesis. Although these primordial traits may function as 
indicators which enable the perpetrators to target who is foreign and who not, they do 
not explain why it is mostly black Africans who are targeted. Language, accent, 
clothing and physical features also make Asian and white foreigners stand out as 
‘other’ (Harris 2002).  
 
2.2.3 Inherited culture  
From the formation of South Africa in 1910 its citizens and visitors have been strictly 
restricted in terms of where they could live and where they were allowed to move. 
Although the restrictions were not as severe as many believe, it is claimed they 
fragmented the country’s population, both socially and literally, and made people 
suspicious of movement across and within the borders (Landau, Polzer & Wa Kabwe-
Segatti 2010: 218). 
Under apartheid blacks in South Africa were turned into ’foreign natives’ in 
their own country, as soon as they went outside of their Bantustans or ‘independent 
homelands’. The law ensured that their presence in urban locations was only 
temporary. Their stay in the cities could not be longer than their usefulness there: they 
were there to build the city, care for gardens and pools, and nurture white children 
(Landau 2011: 3-5). The motivation for alienating and excluding some citizens was 
not only related to efficiency and health, but also to the concern that high population 
density and acute deprivation were factors that could resist the apartheid state’s 
distorted and racist vision. This inheritance from the apartheid era helped form the 
socio-political configurations that shaped the 2008 attacks. Two features of this in 
particular are examined in the book Exorcising the Demons Within (ed. Landau 2011). 
Firstly, there was the view that unregulated and even regulated human mobility was a 
threat to the insiders’ economic and physical wellbeing and to national/sub-national 
achievement. A former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, expressed 
this in 1997: 
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South Africa is faced with another threat, and that is the SADC ideology of free movement of 
people, free trade and freedom to choose where you live or work. Free movement of persons 
spells disaster for our country (Landau 2011: 6) 
 
These fears of movemnet have put the creation of any Schengen-like free movement 
plan like this on hold (Landau 2011:8). Secondly, individuals’ geographic and cultural 
origins were used to determine their potential usefulness and claim to citizenship. In 
South Africa there is a deep suspicion of those who move around, both within popular 
and the official discourses. The government’s restrictive and exclusionary 
immigration policies are intended to protect the new members of the new South 
Africa  (Landau 2011:5).  
So one can see xenophobia as a consequence of apartheid as this regime kept 
South Africans apart and away from contact with others. South Africans were isolated 
from the international world through sanctions, and were internally isolated by the 
apartheid regime (Harris 2002). When a group has no history of contact with other 
nationalities except for the counties of southern Africa, it might be difficult to be 
welcoming toward migrants of other nationalities coming into the country (Morris 
1998: 1125). When the isolation broke down and people from other different counties 
came to South Africa, there could have been some inability to tolerate and incorporate 
the differences. In other words in the transition from isolation, xenophobic attitudes 
occurred as a reaction to allowing the ‘other’ closer (Harris 2002). The groups who 
longed for mobility under the apartheid system now called for restrictions to be 
imposed on the immigrants, a solution to the ‘foreign-problem’ that echoes the 
solutions used by the apartheid regime (Everatt 2011: 20). But to blame the 
xenophobic attacks on an inherited culture takes agency away from the people who 
committed these attacks, and therefore Hopstock and de Jager (2011) argue that while 
inherited culture might explain some of the xenophobia in South Africa, it is not 
enough to explain the frequent occurrence of such attacks. In addition this is a 
problematic argument in the light of South Africa’s long history of migrant labour 
from other southern African countries like Botswana and Mozambique, and also in the 
light of the liberation movement’s interactions with nationals of other countries whilst 
in exile. Zimbabweans, who come from a southern African country, are often targets 
of xenophobia – indicating again that isolation can be contested as a sufficient 
explanation.  
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2.3 Structural Explanations 
This grouping will look at the structural aspect of society and at the socio-economic 
context to see how this can lead to xenophobia. It includes relative deprivation theory 
that explores the economic deprivation in South Africa while the theory of ethnic 
violence explains the makeup of ethnic violent events; group threat theory looks at 
how group positions play a part in intergroup hostility. Though this group does 
overlap with socio-cultural explanations, I have chosen to place these two 
explanations under ‘structural explanations’ because the explanations have a structural 
base.  
 
2.3.1 Relative deprivation theory 
Relative deprivation theory suggests that the psychological factor of relative 
deprivation is a key factor in explaining social unrest. The feeling of relative 
deprivation derives from the subjective feeling of dissatisfaction, based on the 
perception that one is getting less than one is entitled to. This gap between reality and 
aspiration means that it is likely that social unrest will develop (Harris 2002). It is 
because this feeling of deprivation has its origin in social-economics that it is placed 
in this grouping.  
It is argued that the relative deprivation theory sheds light on the underlying 
causes of xenophobia in South Africa.  It relates to the socio-economic context in 
which people find themselves. Poverty in the country is very high, with over 50 per 
cent of people living in extreme poverty. In addition, South Africa has the biggest gap 
between rich and poor in the world (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). The unemployment 
rates are very high, with an figure of 25,4 per cent in the third quarter of 2014 
(Statistice South Africa 2014a). Although the true number of unemployed people is 
considerably higher taken into consideration that the people not registered as 
unemployed, though still with no job, are not taken into consideration by this number 
(Statistics South Africa 2014b). These economic conditions are still associated with 
racial categories. Poor groups, often blacks, live in townships on the edges of 
traditionally white residential communities, and this can be an explosive combination. 
These divided communities are easily inflamed (Landau 2011: 12).  Places where 
there were outbreaks of xenophobic violence in May 2008 have also been sites of 
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violence and protest over other issues, such as service delivery problems (Coplan 
2009: 76).  
Poor black urban residents experience fierce competition over jobs, inadequate 
service provision in their informal settlements, and poor service delivery to their 
neighbourhoods. There is little effective government communication to residents on 
these issues and there is corruption among government officials and the police, 
particularly regarding the state treatment of foreigners living in these neighbourhoods 
(Bekker 2010: 134 and HSRC 2008). These urban residents are not getting what they 
expect, and this turns to frustration that “boils over” and often the most vulnerable are 
targeted. For example, service delivery failures are blamed on perceived competitors 
and on those who seem to be doing “better” than local residents, namely the 
foreigners (Bekker 2010: 132). Blame is thus deflected from the government that is 
failing to deliver the promised services.  The people actually responsible for the 
deprivation of the poor – namely the African National Congress (ANC) government 
and its failure to deliver services to all the poor, the new multiracial economic elite 
and those who benefited from the redistributive policies – were not targeted; instead it 
was the foreigners who were blamed (Du Toit and Kotzé 2011: 162). 
The instigators of the xenophobic attacks often come from groups that are 
unable to compete effectively in a modernizing economy and society, while the 
targets are those who are able to do this. Violence becomes a desperate act in which 
the perpetrators seek to compensate for their shortcomings (Du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 
162). Steinberg (2008) argues that in the townships democracy in South Africa is 
understood to be about gaining access to largesse and resources that the state is able to 
distribute. They also see wealth as a measure of success, and its distribution is seen as 
a zero-sum game: if the wealth goes to a foreigner that means that a South African has 
lost the possibility to acquire this wealth. A more ‘deserving’ citizen has lost wealth 
when a foreigner gains it. Furthermore democracy is seen as a system based on 
patronage, thus if a foreigner prospers without any access to the state this offends that 
conception of the state. It also upsets the concept of what it means to be a South 
African living in a democracy and the entitlements that are due to citizens (Steinberg 
2008: 2).  
Devan Pillay (2008: 94) argues that despite the desire to share, or the existence 
of a redistributive discourse, in the aftermath of democratization there has arisen a 
system of violence against the majority of the people. The people hurt by this violence 
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have in desperation lashed out against the people closest to them (foreigners) instead 
of at the people who are really responsible for their continued deprivation, their 
country’s government. The rising inequality in South Africa will in his opinion breed 
perverse cultures of entitlement and a perception of relative deprivation, as these are 
the products of social instability. Pillay goes on to distinguish between illegitimate 
expectation and legitimate expectation. In the first category he places people who say 
they deserve a new sports car, because there are people who earn and spend even 
more money, or because there are Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) earning millions. 
The workers, however, earn next to nothing and they cannot afford to demand more as 
they must be happy to get anything at all. In this category of illegitimate expectation 
he also places criminals. Criminality may be chosen when socially legitimate ways of 
earning a living are unavailable. In a culture where corruption, greed and the 
glorification of consumption are flourishing, desperate people might not stop at 
stealing in order to survive. They also to seek to imitate richer lifestyles. In the second 
category, that of legitimate expectation, Pillay places demands for food, warmth, 
clean water, shelter and security – things that are entrenched in the Constitution and 
are indeed basic human rights (Pillay 2008: 97-98).  
Democratization did give some blacks political power, but they are few indeed 
and constitute a new elite, while the majority have stayed poor and inequality keeps 
growing. The injustice felt by the poor is bubbling under the surface and when these 
people, who are on the outside of the wealth-creating sector, are not organized in 
unions or other social movements, violence can occur. When all this anger is not 
channelled into a political movement with some hope of bringing about a change, then 
together with a xenophobic press, for example calling immigrants aliens or illegals 
(Harber 2008: 162-163), and ill-advised government statements, this can lead to 
events such as those of May 2008 (Pillay 2008: 100-101). Relative depravation does 
not imply blaming poverty as a cause in itself; it implies recognising it as an 
underlying condition which leads to volatility when coupled with unmet expectations. 
These expectations and the perceived threats from foreigners when it comes to access 
to housing and resources do not cause people to commit violent acts, but they do lead 
to frustration. It is this frustration that leads to anger, and this anger is turned on 
“frustration scapegoats”, namely foreigners (Harris 2002). 
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2.3.2 Theory of ethnic violence 
Horowitz, a Professor at Duke University and a leading academic on ethnic conflict, 
has developed a theory of ethnic violence that can be used when examining 
xenophobia. He says that both external contextual causes in addition to immediate 
locality-bound causes need to be considered when looking at violent outbursts. 
Locality-bound causes imply local and short-term issues and therefore also imply 
spontaneity and the deep-seated emotions associated with outbreaks of violence 
(Horowitz 2001).  
According to this theory violence against foreigners would emerge under very 
specific structural conditions. This is likely to emerge where there is little fear that the 
police will protect the victims; in other words police ineffectiveness or bias favours 
the perpetrators of violence. Furthermore, the authorities implicitly condone the 
actions of the perpetrators, the police do not act against them, and the perpetrators do 
not fear reprisals from the targets of the violence. Fluctuations in government policies 
also threaten the position of the instigators and these policies could push them even 
further down the social ladder (Du Toit and Kotzé 2011: 170).  
Horowitz also explains who is likely to conduct a riot and how this will 
develop. Lethal ethnic riots, which is how some describe the May 2008 riots, are 
attacks by one ethnic group on another group. Frequently the riots are conducted by a 
lower-ranking group who attack a more successful higher-ranking group. A group is 
motivated by fear of being pushed into a dangerous position and having their social 
status being reduced. This fear then can lead to extreme physical harm to people 
whom they believe to be the cause of their (potential) decline in status. The targets are 
selected on the basis of the group they are perceived to belong to, on the basis of 
proximity, level of threat and (perceived) inability to retaliate. The aim of these 
attacks is to kill and to injure. Unlike genocidal violence, however, these attacks are 
not aimed at eliminating a particular group, but at rectifying perceived grievances 
regarding social status. Violence becomes an end in itself and a way of sending a 
message to the victims (Horowitz 2001).  
These types of events usually follow a particular sequence. Firstly, there is a 
particular precipitant which initiates the first violent outburst. This may be perceived 
threats from the target group. This is followed by an unsettling event, most often in 
the form of low-intensity violence. Thirdly, there is a lull, and during this lull rumours 
are generated and spread. These rumours are not based on reality; they suggest that 
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the target group is a threat and in this way justify violence against this group. 
Fourthly, we have the extreme form of violence. This violence often takes the form of 
riots and it targets especially male victims, who may be murdered, mutilated or 
tortured etc. Mutilation of victims helps express contempt for the enemy and (for the 
attacker) retrieves honour. The final ‘stage’ of the riot is when the violence spreads to 
other locations and the similar events recur, often in a copycat fashion (Horowitz 
2001: 71-123). 
This description Horowitz gives of a riot is similar to the xenophobic events in 
May 2008 in South Africa. This is illustrated by a quote from an instigator after the 
events in 2008: 
 
“[G]overnment is fighting against us, employers are fighting against us and foreigners are 
fighting against us, that is why we fight against them because they are nearer; they don’t 
support our struggle…” (HSRC 2008: 45).  
 
It can be seen in this quote that this particular instigator blames the government and 
the employers for “fighting against” them – as well as blaming the foreigner. This 
goes back to Horowitz’s point: he says that the violence happens for fear of receiving 
a reduced social status. The instigator explains that the foreigners are selected on 
account of their relative proximity. Furthermore, the instigators would heavily 
outnumber the foreigners and therefore would not fear retaliation. There is also 
evidence in this quote pointing to external causes, “the government” level, and to 
more local or immediate causes: “employers” and “foreigners”, which Horowitz 
argues are needed for an ethnic riot to take place. Accordingly, an ethnic riot could 
well occur in South Africa, in accordance with Horowitz’s theory. 
 
2.3.3 Group threat theory 
Group threat theory suggests that inter-group hostility is largely a reaction to 
perceived threats from subordinate group(s). If the dominant group finds that their 
position vis-à-vis the minority group is in jeopardy and feels that they might lose their 
advantaged social position, hostility can arise (King 2007: 1225). In this theory racial 
or group prejudice exists in a sense of group position and in the relationship between 
these groups rather than in a set of feelings which one group has towards another 
group. So this theory looks at the collective process of how a group defines and 
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redefines another group, rather than at individual experiences with the other group 
(Blumer 1959: 3). If one defines oneself as belonging to a group, one must also define 
and assign other people to another group, otherwise there would be no reason for 
group definition. It would be like one hand clapping (Eriksen 2002:10).  
 Herbert Blumer (1959: 4), one of the key theorists here, writes that the sense 
of social position that emerges from the collective process of defining your own and 
other groups leads to prejudice. He identifies four basic types of prejudice that can be 
found in the dominant group. Firstly that the dominant group will have a feeling of 
superiority; they will feel that they are naturally better. Secondly they will feel that the 
subordinate group is different and alien, that they are “not of our kind” (Blumer 1959: 
4). Thirdly, the dominant group will feel that they have proprietary rights to certain 
areas of privilege and advantage. This can include certain property rights, or rights to 
certain jobs, or membership of certain schools, churches etc. Lastly there is a fear and 
suspicion that the subordinate group threatens, or will threaten, the position of the 
dominant group. This is seen as an attack on their natural superiority. Blumer argues 
that the dominant group is not interested in the subordinate group as such, but they are 
interested in the position their group holds in relation to the subordinate group. He 
also points to the importance of this collective group feeling, which transcends the 
feelings of the individual members of the dominant group (Blumer 1958: 4). The 
prejudice will be more frequent where the fourth type of feeling, of threat, is 
strongest, for example where the subordinate group is relatively large and there is 
competition for social resources like jobs and housing (King 2007: 1225).  
 Although this theory was originally a theory of prejudice and discrimination, 
the threat hypothesis “informs a wealth of research on formal social control and 
criminal punishment” (King 2007: 1225-1226). There is also relevance to xenophobic 
events in this theory. The foreigner is seen as a member of a subordinate group that 
the dominant group, the locals, sees as threatening their dominant position. The 
feeling the dominant group has (that it is entitled to social goods and that it has a 
natural right to its superior position) can also be seen in the relationship between the 
“local group” and the “foreigner group”.  This is expressed in attitudes like ‘They are 
taking our jobs’. This theory therefore also provides an explanation for xenophobia in 
South Africa.  
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2.4 Institutional explanations 
The role of the state falls under the heading of institutional explanations. In 
accordance with Max Weber’s (1946) understanding of the state, the state holds a 
monopoly on violence and should offer security for its people so that democracy can 
flourish. Furthermore, the state has the responsibility for protecting its people’s rights 
within the state’s territory and the rights of nationals abroad (Du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 
35). What a state does and signals can have a big impact on what goes on in a country. 
Therefore some state-centred explanations may help to explain the prevailing 
xenophobia.  
 
2.4.1 Attitude and behaviour of civil servants  
During the May 2008 violence the government at first denied that there was a crisis at 
all. Then they blamed criminal elements, opposition parties and a “third force” of pro-
apartheid movements (Bekker 2010: 126). However statements from township 
residents during and after these events made it clear that the violence emanated from 
among their inhabitants (Landau 2011: 1). One particular actor the government 
blamed was the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), whose leaders were said to have 
encouraged members in workers’ hostels to attack foreigners (Copland 2009: 76). 
Perhaps this was not without reason as Ephraim Sipho Mbatha, a leader of the Inkatha 
Freedom Party, justified the 2008 attacks with these xenophobic words, which also 
undermined the government as well: 
 
The government is now pampering them and taking care of them nicely. As long as the 
foreigners are here we will always have unemployment and poverty in South Africa. There 
was no poverty and unemployment in South Africa before the influx of foreigners … there is 
too much of them now. If the government does not do something people will see what to do to 
solve the problem because it means it’s not the government problem it is our problem (Landau 
2011: 13).  
 
The riots in May 2008 and the way the government handled them showed the world 
that the government had failed to meet its legal and international obligations to 
refugees, which South Africa had previously committed to (Du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 
171). It can be claimed that the government is culpable for the outbreak of the 
violence on two counts. (1) They failed in the implementation of their policies; they 
have been unsuccessful in uplifting the mass of the poorest in South Africa, who have 
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not only had their collective self-esteem taken away, but have sunk even deeper into 
destitution. (2) In addition to their policy failures, the government allowed a large 
immigrant community to form; the legal standing of its members varied. Moreover, 
they have failed in their duty to protect this group, thereby conveying the notion that 
this group could be the target of violence without the fear of government intervention 
(Du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 171). 
Many believed that President Jacob Zuma had promised to expel all foreigners 
if he became president during his election campaign, and the number of xenophobic 
attacks carried out in Zuma’s name increased after he came to office (Coplan 2009: 
77). Even the police said they did not approve asylum papers after Zuma became 
president, because they were ‘Mbeki papers’. Foreigners were told to trade their 
papers in for correct ones or better still, to leave the country. However when Zuma 
came to power he did not expel all forigners, and rather promoted human rights and 
had talkes with foreign interest groups (Coplan 2009: 77).  
The then Johannesburg mayor confirmed a widely held point of view when he 
commented in 2004: “While migrancy contributes to the rich tapestry of the 
cosmopolitan city, it also places a severe strain on employment levels, housing and 
public services” (Landau 2011: 7). This reflects on rapid urbanization and the 
problems that arise with this phenomenon. It also confirms the associated notion that 
new arrivals are going to make the situation worse, not better. Although many South 
African politicians are publicly tolerant and committed to regional integration, and 
recognize the country’s humanitarian obligations, this is not reflected in their actions. 
Their public stand is not supported by the country’s legal and administrative 
mechanisms, which actively discourage the movement of migrants with low or 
moderate skills (Landau 2011: 7). It is very hard for immigrants with temporary 
contracts, or no contracts, or with refugee/asylum-seeker status to regularize their stay 
or claim a permanent status in South Africa. As a consequence of this, most of the 1,5 
million (2011) immigrants in this country stay in South Africa with few legal rights 
and little protection. Life for non-nationals has many parallels with life for blacks 
under the apartheid regime (Landau 2011: 7-8). They are vulnerable to attack and 
there is minimal state protection. 
The way the state allows human rights violations and legal breaches to 
continue when it comes to immigrants has created conditions where the “proof of a 
criminal charge is a redundant complication- at least as far as foreign refugees are 
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concerned” (Landau 2011: 9). This can be seen in statements made by government 
officials such as that by Defence Minister Joe Modise in 1997: 
 
As for crime, the army is helping the police get rid of crime and violence in the country. 
However, what can we do? We have one million illegal immigrants in our country who 
commit crimes and who are mistaken by some people for South African citizens. That is the 
real problem (Landau 2011: 9). 
 
This statement reflects the way immigrants are equated with crime; in addition it is 
feared that they will blend into South African society. Furthermore, in 2002 the then 
Director-General of Home Affairs, Billy Masetlha, stated: 
 
Approximately 90 per cent of foreign persons who are in RSA with fraudulent documents, i.e., 
either citizenship or migration documents, are involved in other crimes as well… it is quicker 
to charge these criminals for their false documentation and then deport them than to pursue the 
long route in respect of the other crimes that are committed (Landau 2011:10). 
 
These statements show that some government officials believe that outsiders can and 
should be alienated (Landau 2011:10). The bad reputation that government has given 
to mobile populations and the practical impossibility of controlling this mobility have 
made migration and migrants both an official and popular obsession; foreigners have 
been turned into convenient scapegoats for problems relating to poor service delivery, 
crime and other social pathologies (Landau 2011: 10-11). 
According to Landau little effort was invested in building and supporting local 
government after the 1994 transition. In effect, political power became centralized 
within the national government and implicitly within the ANC, which meant that 
popular participation was limited (Landau 2011: 12). The poor in South Africa saw 
this elitist group as being unconcerned with issues such as unemployment, service 
provision and security, especially under the rule of President Thabo Mbeki (Landau 
2011: 12). The high and rising food and fuel costs, the electricity crisis and the ‘flood’ 
of Zimbabwean immigrants all contributed to a sense of crisis in the country and to 
the feeling that the government was doing little to address it. This formed a perfect 
breeding ground for mobilizing the poor, and given the history of demonization of 
foreigners, it is not surprising that they became a target of mass action (Landau 2011: 
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12). A South African confirms this attitude in this statement after the May 2008 
attacks:  
 
We are not trying to kill anyone but rather solving the problems of our own country. The 
government is not doing anything about this, so I support what the mob is doing to get rid of 
foreigners in our country (Landau 2011: 13).  
 
An unemployed man outside Pretoria agreed: “…if the government is failing to stop 
them at the borders, we shall stop them here in Itireleng. We are not the police; we do 
not ask for passports, they are forged anyway” (Landau 2011: 13). 
 However Misago takes a different stand with regard to the local government 
and its officials, which he identifies as micropolitics.  He says that throughout his 
research after the May 2008 xenophobia it was found that the violence was organized 
and led by local political players. He said they did this “as an attempt to claim or 
consolidate the power and the authority needed to further their political and economic 
interest” (Misago 2011: 105). He goes on to say that the way local politicians and 
leaders led their followers could either foster and trigger or prevent violence (Misago 
2011: 89). Misago (2011: 100) argues that despite the violence being illegal and also 
destructive, there was another side to the story: Organizing the attacks on foreigners 
or other unwanted ‘outsider’ groups has been an effective strategy for “earning 
people’s trust, gaining legitimacy and expanding a client base and the revenue 
associated with it” (Misago 2011: 100). In other words this suggests that that local 
political players, whether formally elected or not, have actively been the trigger for 
xenophobic violence and other types of violence.   
Since these attacks the government has claimed that foreigners are safe and 
that “we have moved forward” (Landau 2011:1). But in spite of what the government 
claims,  contemporary society in South Africa is ready to turn on itself (Landau 2011: 
1-2). This section has shown that the government seeks to blame attacks like those in 
May 2008 on causes other than xenophobia:  if these were xenophobic, the 
government would have to assume more responsibility. In fact government can also 
be seen as helping to create xenophobia with statements such as those cited above.  
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2.4.2 Gap between written policy and policy in practice 
South Africa has experienced a significant influx of migrants from other African 
countries since 1994. Immigrants numbered just under 1.9 million in 2010 and 72 per 
cent of these came from other African countries (Crush & Ramachandran 2010). Most 
of these immigrants are undocumented; they usually end up in the Gauteng province 
and stay in informal urban settlements. The South African government has been slow 
to develop a response to this influx of migrants. The post-1994 government struggled 
to rewrite the racist immigration policy of the apartheid era to accord with its new role 
in the region (Bekker 2010: 141). In fact the Aliens Control Act No. 96 of 1991 
allows officials to make random arrests based on such factors as skin colour, 
vaccination marks, accent or understanding of local dialects (Everatt 2011: 13). This 
act has been nicknamed “apartheid’s last act”, and is in great contrast to the rights-
based focus of most post-apartheid legislation.  
However acts such as the Refugee Act No. 130 of 1998 and the Immigration 
Act 13 of 2002 reflect this new focus. The Refugee Act No. 130 of 1998 bases its 
conditions for obtaining refugee status on United Nations (UN) guidelines. This act 
also says that no one shall be denied entry into the country if they are denied their 
human rights in their country of origin (Refugee Act No. 130 of 1998, Ch. 2). 
Furthermore, the interpretation, application and administration of this act shall follow 
the refugee conventions and protocols of the UN, the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU1) and be consistent with other relevant international agreements South Africa is 
a party to. In addition it must follow the UN Human Rights Charter (Refugee Act No. 
130 of 1998, Ch 6). The objectives of the Immigration Act No.13 of 2002 are, inter 
alia, to promote a human-rights-based culture, and to “prevent and deter xenophobia” 
within the Department of Home Affairs, the government, any organ of the state and 
on a community level (Immigration Act No. 130 of 2002, Ch 2). These two acts 
project the image of a country with a forward thinking and liberal policy towards 
immigrants. This was further emphasised when Zimbabwean projects were launched 
in 2010. These permits, or visas were only for Zimbabweans and served as a way of 
recording the many undocumented Zimbabweans in South Africa. The permits were 
free and could be obtained if the applicant possessed a Zimbabwean passport and a 
letter from his or her employer. Zimbabweans could live, study and work in South 
                                                "!OAU (Organisation of African Unity) was disbanded in 2002, and AU (African Union) has taken 
over its role.   
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Africa legally with this permit. Even if the application for this special dispensation 
visa was pending, the applicant had the right to work, study and have access to basic 
health care (PASSOP 2014b). This was a step which many will argue was in the 
‘right’ direction – a step towards a rational, coherent and regionally beneficial 
migration management approach (Hopstock & De Jager 2011). 
With the granting of Zimbabwean permits, South Africa should expect a 
greater number of Zimbabwean nationals crossing the border to be recorded on paper, 
though this might not mean there are more Zimbabweans in the country in total. This 
is because many more Zimbabwean migrants will opt to take the documented route 
than was previously the case. Almost 250 000 Zimbabweans have received this permit 
(Sapa 2014). Some argue that this may reduce the feeling of ‘us vs. them’ and thereby 
calm xenophobic sentiments. However this is perhaps wishful thinking, since a higher 
number in the records can seem like a higher number in general and this may hinder 
the issuing of further permits (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). These special dispensation 
visas were given out for a four-year period, which means they are expiring in 2014 (as 
this is being written), and to date the fate of this visa has not yet been decided (Sapa 
2014). Perhaps this was the first and last dispensation of its kind.   
Along with the Acts described above, the Constitution also guarantees basic 
human and legal rights to everyone living in South Africa (SA Constitution 1996: 
Preamble). This includes both documented and undocumented non-citizens, as they 
are also living in South Africa, but this is not always the case in practice. The laws 
governing asylum in South Africa are among the most progressive in the world, but 
the impact that foreigners may have on the country is nevertheless feared. To date 
there has been a focus on deportation, detention and the denial of these rights 
(Hopstock & de Jager 2011). In other words, there is a big gap between policy and 
practice (Bekker 2010: 141). 
It is claimed that Home Affairs does not control the country’s borders, and that 
it does not differentiate between legal and illegal arrivals, or make special provision 
for African immigrants (Copland 2009: 75). The undocumented arrivals have a 
diminished legal standing in accordance with state provisions and become easy targets 
for state agencies. There are frequent allegations of police brutality against foreigners 
as well as of degrading treatment by the Home Affairs officials (Du Toit & Kotzé 
2011: 171). In Johannesburg the police call themselves “Border police”, and they 
have made it their business to prey on African immigrants, extorting bribes from those 
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who have money, and detaining and deporting those who do not. There is also a lot of 
corruption at the actual border, where cash is substituted for passports, permits and 
visas (Coplan 2009: 71). Moreover, at the Office of Home Affairs South African 
identity documents are on sale, and any and every document is available for an 
unofficial charge (Coplan 2009: 71).  
The stigma towards and vulnerability of foreigners in South Africa is evident 
in the great efforts the government makes to deport immigrants. People are detained 
throughout the country on the basis of their physical appearance, their inability to 
speak a specific language, or for fitting the ‘typical’ undocumented migrant profile. 
This leads to ‘too-dark-skinned’ people, undocumented people and/or people 
belonging to a linguistic minority who are South African being harassed and arrested 
as if they were foreigners, and even occasionally being deported (Landau 2011:8). 
South Africa deported 300 000 people in 2007, a year before the May 2008 attacks, 
which makes South Africa one of the world’s leaders in deportation. In addition, 
Johannesburg police spend thousands of hours detaining, questioning and arresting 
foreigners, indicating a more than mild interest in immigration control (Landau 2011: 
3) and suggesting that it is important to put foreigners in their place.  
Landau (2011: 5-7) writes that the strong wish to divide insiders from 
outsiders is very evident in the practice of post-apartheid immigration control. The 
government has drawn up a regulation that serves as a cognitive and spatial means of 
distinguishing deserving citizens from outsiders who can be denied legal identities in 
spite of their proximity and utility and in spite of the Constitution. The post-apartheid 
state has used similar techniques to the apartheid regime to alienate and isolate non-
nationals and keep them away from the urban centres. However in both the apartheid 
and the post-apartheid eras, outsiders managed to find a place in the city, mostly 
through fraud and dissimulation (Landau 2011: 7). Landau says there are three areas 
in particular where the state’s legal and coercive efforts are focused to exclude 
immigrants: (1) legal status and documentation for refugees and migrants; (2) arrests, 
detention and deportation; and (3) a general lack of access to constitutional protection 
through the courts and the political process. Of these three areas, only detention and 
deportation are ‘reserved’ for foreign nationals, but what separates non-nationals from 
citizens is the degree to which the non-nationals are excluded is both bureaucratically 
and socially legitimate. So in addition to the material fact of being denied services or 
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being harassed, there is also a national discourse that justifies this treatment, and 
which marginalizes foreigners (Landau 2011: 7-8).  
New policies are constantly being drawn up, like the policy in relation to 
Zimbabwean migration, and local government authorities have begun to see that 
migration is an issue that they cannot ignore. Although it is recognised that population 
movements are affecting the state’s ability to deliver services and to reduce poverty 
levels, the knowledge and capability to address this is lacking. Although there is 
popular support to restrict movement into the country, this is not the appropriate way 
to address the issue: restricting migration is not possible and is not a solution to the 
issue. In fact Landau, Polzer and Wa Kabwe-Segatti write that despite the problems 
associated with swift urbanization, research suggests that moving from poor rural 
areas into the city is a quick way of promoting human development. Thus they argue 
that the government should look at ways to respond more effectively to mobility 
rather than seeking to restrict it. Although mobility is mostly criticized for its negative 
effects, these effects are not the only tangible outcomes, since there is proof of 
positive outcomes as well (Landau, Polzer & Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2010: 218-19). 
Furthermore, they argue that human mobility is linked to two key challenges: social 
cohesion and public service provision. One of the major problems in managing the 
issue of mobility is that it is not yet recognized across the board as something that 
needs management. Therefore officials need to be made aware of the importance of 
managing mobility and they need to overcome the fear and denial that comes with 
discussing migration (Landau, Polzer & Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2010: 232). Also because 
migration is not seen as a possible contributor to development, it is disregarded as a 
development strategy (Hopstock & de Jager 2011).  
To neglect the topic of mobility and disregard the positive aspects of migration 
can lead to an excessive focus on the negative aspects of migration, thereby furthering 
xenophobic perceptions. Another problem related to the presence of Zimbabweans is 
that they are classified in South Africa as economic immigrants. This neglects the 
political aspect of Zimbabwean migration, despite the fact that the economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe is to a large extent of political origin. Classifying Zimbabweans as 
economic immigrants suggests that they are competing with South Africans for jobs 
in the country, and not that they are temporary immigrants who have fled for their 
lives (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). When the gap between the written policy and the 
actual execution of it is so great this also creates insecurity among South Africans and 
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foreigners about their place, rights and future, and this leaves room for xenophobia to 
continue. 
 
2.4.3 State agencies: police and the detaining of foreigners 
The police have a code of conduct that advises them to treat and protect all persons 
equally. Yet, as seen in the examples above and elsewhere, there are complaints about 
the police targeting foreigners for harassment, extortion and other corrupt activities. A 
survey conducted by Wits University found that 71 per cent of foreigners had been 
stopped by the police, while only 47 per cent of South Africans had been stopped. 
Thus there has been a high degree of foreign-profiling within the South African Police 
Service (SAPS), according to skin colour, language and the way of dressing (SAHRC 
2006: 32). Moreover, police often refuse to recognize work permits or refugee identity 
cards and might even destroy them to justify an arrest. It has even been reported that 
foreigners who might face deportation could pay to jump off moving trains (SAHRC 
2006: 32). Some of these actions might stem from seeing foreigners as “mobile 
ATMs” (Landau 2011: 9).  
The police’s ‘role players’ in the communities, who normally assisted the 
police, sided with the perpetrators during the May 2008 attacks in Cape Town. 
Furthermore, refugees seeking shelter with police did not go to the closest police 
station in the townships, but to more distant middle-class areas, as they were not 
confident that the local police would protect them.  So civil society non-state policing 
agents, like traditional authorities, play a critical security role in South African society 
(Bekker 2010: 145). The difficulty arises when the state no longer has the capacity to 
make non-state policing accountable and these players endorse intolerance of 
outsiders and the associated violence, like that seen prior to, during and after the 
attacks in May 2008. Thus there is also a problem with the perceptions of local 
residents when it comes to the role and legitimacy of non-state police organizations 
(Bekker 2010: 146). 
Police often use extra-legal forms of harassment and immigration to contain or 
prevent crime and to protect the South African social project. The city of 
Johannesburg and other municipalities have also used many resources to rid the city 
of what they perceive to be a hostile alien presence. Senior officers proudly report on 
their successes as a way of combating social exclusion and helping the city to realize 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
33 
its potential (Landau 2011: 9). Thus the SAPS are a contributing force to xenophobia 
in South Africa, in addition to committing xenophobic acts themselves.  
Those immigrants arrested and unable to pay for their release are often taken 
to the Lindela repatriation centre. This is a privately managed detention centre outside 
of Johannesburg. Section 35 (1) of the Bill of Rights provides for the rights of 
arrested, detained and accused persons: they should be informed of the reason for 
their being held; the conditions where one is held should be compatible with one’s 
human dignity; and one should be able to communicate with relatives, religious 
counsellors and medical personnel (SAHRC 2006: 35). But in reports about the 
Lindela centre we see evidence yet again that immigrants are denied these legal rights. 
There have been reports of sexual abuse, assault, bribery, extortion, unlawful 
detention, poor conditions, inadequate nutrition, no medical care, interrupted sleep 
and overcrowded cells; people were denied the right to apply for asylum, and 
detainees were held for longer than was legally permitted (Landau 2011:9 and 
SAHRC 2006: 35). Inmates at the centre were also denied legal representation and 
were even forced to pay bribes to be deported (Landau 2011: 9). There were 176 
prolonged detentions reported in September 2004 alone, and it is thought that this had 
to do with the R50 the centre gets per day per inmate from the state. Asylum seekers 
who have been denied asylum may be sent back to a country where their lives and 
freedom are at risk. There were also many deaths in the centre, often as a result of 
meningitis and pneumonia. It has also been reported that only people of African origin 
are arrested and deported as illegal aliens (SAHRC 2006: 35-36). The detainees are 
often kept in a state of uncertainty. About half do not receive any formal notification 
that they are to be deported before they arrive at Lindela, and only a few of them 
receive this notification after they have arrived. This leads to much confusion and 
insecurity. Many detainees are left with unanswered questions as to why they are 
there, what is going on and what the future will bring (Sutton & Vigneswaran 2011: 
636). That this treatment is going on with virtually no improvement despite several 
reports is also a sign of the extent of xenophobia in the country. Allowing this to go 
on is not only xenophobic in itself, but it also strengthens xenophobic perceptions. 
The human rights and legal violations are known to exist, but they continue 
nevertheless. The centre has become a symbol of what is regarded as the ‘appropriate’ 
way to treat outsiders (Landau 2011: 9).   
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2.5 The Nature of Xenophobia in South Africa 
This section will cover the nature of xenophobia in South Africa. Nature of 
xenophobia refers to its basic features or characteristics. These are identified in South 
Africa as being violent behaviour and that this behaviour targets black African 
migrants. Xenophobia refers to the attitudes people have towards foreigners and the 
behaviour people direct towards foreigners. Xenophobic attitudes are those which are 
held against a group of people solely on the basis of this group’s other nationality. 
Xenophobic behaviour consists of physical acts directed towards a group, again solely 
because members of this group belong to another nationality. This behaviour can 
often be violent. It is important to include actual behaviour because xenophobia often 
plays out in this country in a violent manner. This is what makes it such a grave 
problem, and this is why this thesis is being written. It is also important to keep in 
mind that these actions are not only carried out by members of the public. State 
officials have also carried out xenophobic attacks, as has been explained earlier in the 
chapter. Another aspect of South African xenophobia has to do with whom it usually 
targets. There are no incidents that I have come across where white foreigners have 
been targeted, and few where Asian foreigners have been targeted. The group that is 
targeted is mainly other black Africans as the litterature on the topic tells us since the 
incidents of xenophobic violence have targeted this group (Harris 2002).  
 When xenophobia was defined in the previous chapter it was said to reflect 
“the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state” (SAHRC, cited in 
Bekker 2010: 127). The problem with this definition is that it implies that xenophobia 
is an attitude or a state of mind, but this phenomenon goes far beyond this in South 
Africa. As stated above, actions resulting from this “dislike” must also be included. 
That is why both xenophobic attitudes and the practices have been looked at. Harris 
(2002) argues that a new definition of xenophobia in South Africa should be adopted. 
Furthermore, she argues that this definition should not only include the practice of the 
xenophobic attitudes but also take into account who is being targeted, since a more 
open definition will include all foreigner-groups.  
The freedom struggle in South Africa started out as a non-violent struggle, but 
in 1961 the African National Congress (ANC) changed direction and began their 
armed struggle. After the Sharpeville shootings in 1960, where 69 people were shot 
and killed by the police, and after the banning of the ANC and the Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC), it seemed as if the space for peaceful protest had been drastically 
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narrowed. This decision was not an easy one to make, given that some of the leaders 
of the struggle were pacifist Christians and that after the banning of their 
organisations it was difficult for them to remain in South Africa (Jeffery 2009: 1-3). 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the president of Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), said that he 
understood why the ANC had embarked on the armed struggled but argued that 
violence was “emotionally and intellectually alien” to black South Africans; he 
decided that the IFP would not join the ANC in their armed struggle (Jeffery 2009: 
51). Nobel Peace Prize laureate and ANC leader Albert Luthuli came with a similar 
point of view:  
 
“[he] feared the government (apartheid government) repression was only hastening the onset 
of an aggressive African nationalism and that African leaders were quickly succumbing to 
extremism.” (Couper 2010: 51)  
 
So violence became a significant part of the freedom struggle in South Africa, though 
in the end freedom was not obtained through war, but through negotiations. As a 
result people have become used to violence, and violence has become a method of 
getting through to those in power. 
 The violence that is associated with xenophobic events is not unique to these 
events. South Africa has seen continuous protests throughout the country, especially 
when it comes to service delivery. These protests often include the blocking of major 
roads, the throwing of rocks, etc. and deaths have resulted from fighting the riot police 
(Serino 2014). Many of these protests do not even make the news, although major 
roads like the N1 might have been shut down.  If it is mentioned it might be on the 
traffic news, with advice about about how to take a detour (Serino 2014). Parks 
Kaiyane, a local activist interviewed by Al Jazeera, said the following:   
 
"When people protest and burn tyres, and blood is shed, that is when you get a response. When 
you call a meeting and speak to them [local officials], it's like you're speaking another 
language. But when you burn tyres, that language is understood." (Serino  2014). 
  
This implies that violence is perceived as being the most effective way of being heard. 
The local government authorities have failed to provide the participatory democracy 
that was promised the people, and so protests (often violent) have become the way for 
marginalised people to voice their grievances (Nieftagodien 2011: 112). This violence 
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is institutionalised through the way the police respond to protests, both by giving a 
violent response themselves, and through not reacting and allowing violence to 
continue (Harris 2001). South African society has seen violent responses throughout 
its history, and xenophobia has become a new form of violence in the democratic era 
(Harris 2001).  
 A violent history is not exclusive to South Africa. Most, perhaps all, African 
countries have violent histories, but African immigrants in South Africa have been 
surprised by the extent of this violence.  In fact, many of the immigrants came to 
South Africa to get away from fighting and violence in their home countries, and do 
not wish to use violence as a solution to problems (Harris 2001). So to blame the 
violence on history is not sufficient in itself. Violence has been embraced by elements 
of South African society to the point that to qualify as newsworthy a certain level of 
violence must be met (Serino 2014). Xenophobia has been presented as a pathology 
because it is not a healthy feature of the new and democratic South Africa. 
Xenophobia is regarded as something negative and abnormal; it is not part of the 
healthy society. But in South Africa violence cannot be separated from normal society 
(Harris 2002). 
Why is it that mostly black African foreigners are the primary targets of 
xenophobia? An easy explanation would be proximity, which is important in relative 
deprivation theory and in Horowitz’s ethnic violence theory. In addition the group 
threat theory would explain that the subordinate group of foreigners must be relatively 
large and that there is competition for example jobs. This scenario will mostly occur 
in the townships where black African foreigners are situated.  In other words that it is 
mostly in townships and lower socio-economic areas that this type of violence occurs 
– both xenophobic violence and the violence of service delivery protests. The 
foreigners that live in these areas are black Africans. It is the foreign black Africans 
that can most easily be reached by this violence. An additional factor may be that it is 
black African foreigners that live alongside the instigators and therfore they are 
believed to be competing with them when comes to housing, jobs, etc. 
So the nature of South African society may be part of the explanation for the 
levels of xenophobia. The society accepts violence as a means to an end and also 
accepts that foreigners are a problem, and this may help to explain the violent nature 
of xenophobia. Perhaps this is where the work should start: one needs to give the 
South African people a different way of channelling their grievances.  
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2.6 Analysis  
Do the above explanations fully explain why there is such a high level of xenophobia 
in South Africa, both in the terms of attitude and practice? Landau (2011: 3) argues 
that, no matter how invaluable they may be in documenting the events of May 2008 
and the immediate reactions to these events, existing accounts more often than not 
reveal the authors’ politics and ideological predilections, rather than explicating the 
causes or the significance of the events. Furthermore, many of the explanations falter 
when faced with empirical evidence or logical interrogation. For example, the 
explanations rooted in the bio-cultural hypothesis may explain how foreigners are 
singled out (by, for example, language, clothes, hair) but they do not account for what 
these differences signify and how these significations have arisen (Harris 2002). Nor 
does it explain why people from Swaziland and Lesotho were left alone, while South 
African minority groups were sometimes targeted.    
 I believe one can see strengths and weaknesses in all the explanations offered 
so far. Social identity theory along with nationalism and the state-centred explanations 
help to account for the way xenophobia has grown and amplified after 1994, but not 
why the xenophobia has been so violent in nature. Furthermore, using foreigners as 
scapegoats in the light of perceived relative deprivation may explain the context of the 
frustration, but not why it is foreigners who are picked out as scapegoats and not 
another group like wealthy whites. Location is perhaps a better explanatory factor. 
Similarly the inherited political culture can explain why South Africans find it 
difficult to deal with strangers since they have experienced separation from many 
nationalities, but it does not explain why this leads to hatred and anxiety, which again 
produces violent attacks. Lastly, as with the relative deprivation theory, the ethnic 
violence theory provides an explanation for the contextual conditions for a ‘riot’. It 
explains the conditions which are needed for a riot to develop. We can see that these 
conditions have been present in South Africa before the xenophobic events took place. 
However Horowitz’s theory does not explain what sparks the ‘riot’ in the first place. 
Therefore these explanations do help to explain xenophobia in South Africa, but do 
not provide a complete explanation. 
Some people claim that this phenomenon is not about xenophobia as such, but 
that the perpetrators for example want to obtain housing – perhaps not even to live in 
themselves, but to rent out or sell; in other words, there may be an element of 
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criminality involved, as the government claims (Coplan 2009: 75). Although this has 
some merit, the criminal and xenophobic arguments are not an either/or alternative; 
they are not mutually exclusive. There was a wish to take down the foreigner, and if 
there was something to be gained in the process, so much the better (Everatt 2011: 27) 
However to say that events like those in May 2008 were not xenophobic in nature, as 
Mbeki claimed, is evasive of the xenophobia in the country.   
The role of the media has not been discussed, but they have supported popular 
perceptions with negative imagery – like ‘floods’ of immigrants, ‘stealing’ of jobs. 
This language makes it easy to target foreigners. Describing undocumented 
immigrants as ‘illegal’ will for example suggest that these immigrants also are 
criminals – since they are ‘illegal’. The media has also separated South Africa from 
the rest of Africa, as if they are two different entities. They have pointed to South 
Africa as being better or more advanced than the rest of the continent; the implication 
may be that the reader should be aware that the presence of these foreigners might 
make South Africa just another African country (Harris 2002).  
Although development has happened in South Africa, psychological scars 
remain. South Africa is still in transition and unstable (Everatt 2011: 28-33). I believe 
much of the explanation lies in the nature of South African society. Violence is 
frequently used as a tool to promote one’s case, and violence is in effect indirectly 
endorsed by state institutions as it produces results. The above explanations suggest 
how attitudes have come to be what they are, and the way that people deal with their 
attitudes completes the story.    
 
2.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview of some of the key explanations for 
xenophobia in South Africa. Since these explanations span a number of disciplines, 
ranging from anthropology to political science to sociology to migration studies, there 
is understandably some overlap in these explanations. They were divided into three 
broad categories. It was also noted that there is some overlap within these categories. 
The explanations were divided into three groups: (1) socio-cultural; (2) structural or 
contextual; and (3) institutional or state-centred explanations. The first group 
included: social identity theory, the bio-cultural hypothesis and the inherited culture. 
The second group consisted of relative deprivation theory, the theory of ethnic 
violence by Horowitz and group threat theory.  The last group, state-centred 
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explanations, included factors such as expressed attitudes by state officials, policy 
formation and the role of state agencies. The different explanations could provide 
some explanation, but were, in my opinion, unable to provide a complete explanation. 
The nature of xenophobia were also emphasised to show their important role in the 
phenomenon.  
 Xenophobia is a crucial issue that urgently needs to be addressed. It targets 
groups in the society that are vulnerable. It makes many people insecure and leads 
them to live in constant fear of violence, often from the institutions that are supposed 
to protect them. It will be instructive to see the explanatory value of these theories 
about xenophobia looking into the specific case of De Doorns.  
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Chapter 3: Contextualisation of the Case Study: Xenophobic 
Attacks in De Doorns 
 
Map 3.1: Location of De Doorns (Google Maps 2014) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide an overview of events at De Doorns, the location of 
xenophobic attacks in November 2009. The purpose of the chapter is twofold: firstly, 
to provide the context in which the xenophobia took place, and secondly, to describe 
the course of events in November 2009 as well as to identify some of the key actors 
involved in responding to the attacks. It is therefore primarily a descriptive chapter.  
 
3.2 De Doorns 
3.2.1 History 
De Doorns is a rural town in the Breede Valley Municipality (BVM) in the Western 
Cape, which is situated within the Cape Winelands District. It is located close to the 
N1 (a national road), 27 km north of Worcester, the major city in the area, and is 140 
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km from Cape Town. De Doorns lies in the beautiful Hex River valley and is 
surrounded by high mountains that are snow-capped in winter (Hex River Valley 
Tourism 2014). The first farmer to bring his livestock into the valley was Roelf Jantz 
Hoeting in early 1700, and this started the change towards the agricultural society that 
exists in the valley today. Before Hoeting’s day Bushmen (or San) and wild animals 
inhabited the valley. Since the Bushmen hunted for their food there was no agriculture 
or animal farming before this time. Other cattle farmers followed Hoeting, and the 
first official farm names were registered on 8 December 1723. By the end of the 18th 
century there were six farms established in the valley. One of these farms was called 
De Doorns, which means ‘the thorns’ in English. It was the home of the De Vos 
family and has subsequently become a community centre for the Hex River Valley 
inhabitants. These six farms have today become nearly 150 subdivisions, and the 
value of one of these subdivisions has greatly multiplied when compared to the value 
of the six original farms (Hex River Valley Tourism 2014). 
 An economic revolution started in the valley back in 1875 when Wells Hood 
surveyed and built the railway through the valley at the cost of one million rand (Hex 
River Valley Tourism 2014). The railway was built to improve transport between 
Cape Town and the diamond fields in Kimberley. Seven years after the opening of the 
pass through the valley the first table grapes were exported to Britain (Tourism Cape 
Town 2014). A few years later, in 1886, the valley’s red and white grapes were 
privately shipped to a Dr. Smuts in London. Unfortunately the type of grape the farms 
were growing at that time, Hanepoot, was rather fragile and did not arrive in the UK 
in good condition. As a solution to this problem another doctor, Dr. Perold, imported 
or smuggled in a Barlinka vine from his visit in Algeria. This new and tougher grape 
type grew well in the valley and was better suited for export to Britain and other 
countries (Hex River Valley Tourism 2014). This explains how this valley, centred in 
and around the town of De Doorns, became the successful grape farming community 
it is today.  
 
3.2.2 Demographic composition 
The Breede Valley Municipality is divided into 21 wards. De Doorns comprises three 
of these wards, wards 2, 3 and 4. Another ward (ward five) has been also listed under 
De Doorns in one report (BVM 2011:124) but in another report it is listed under 
another area (BVM 2012: 32). This fourth ward is located north of Worcester at the 
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entrance of Hex River Valley, but as it also includes a section of a Worcester 
neighbourhood it will not be counted here as part of De Doorns. 
The De Doorns area comprises about 9500 hectares and is predominantly 
farmed for table grapes. The railway line separates the valley into a western part and 
an eastern part. This has become a socio-economic divide. West of the railway has 
traditionally been the white section of De Doorns. It is a lower density residential area 
in the “older” part of town. It is also on the western side that commercial development 
has taken place. The eastern side of the railway line accommodates those people that 
were previously disadvantaged by the apartheid regime. This eastern side has a high-
density residential area and there is little commercial development. The only signs of 
development are schools, churches and small, scattered shops or market places. It is in 
the low-lying areas on the eastern side that most of the informal settlements are 
located. These settlements have been given the names of Stofland, Hassie Square and 
Ekuphumleni (BVM 2011: 102).  
Ward 2 is located east of the railway line and this is where the three informal 
settlements are located (BVM 2011: 89). Ward 3 comprises De Doorns North of the 
N1 and covers both sides of the railway; it includes ± 75% of the residential area 
(BVM 2011: 102). Ward 4 is the central section of Hex River Valley and includes the 
town centre and adjacent farming community (BVM 2011: 113).   
The three wards have a combined population of 25 723 (BVM 2011: 89-119). 
However the report does not mention an immigrant population or the fluctuating 
population of seasonal workers in the town. The age structure is similar in all the 
wards. 34% of the population in De Doorns is between 0 and 14 years, 36.2% is 
between 15 and 34 years, 26.9% is between 35 and 64 years and 3.7% is over 65 
years. This means there is a rather young population (BVM 2011: 89-119). The 
population breakdown (based on old apartheid/racial categories) in De Doorns in 2011 
varies from ward to ward, but the combined figures are as follows: 29.4% Black 
African; 63.9% Coloured; 0.04% Indian/Asian; and 6.5% White. The differences 
between the wards can be explained by the division caused by the railway: we find 
more black Africans in the eastern ward (Ward 2) and also in the northern ward (Ward 
3); there are comparatively few black Africans in Ward 4. There are also more white 
people in Ward 4 than there are in Wards 2 and 3. Coloureds are the biggest group in 
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the valley and are concentrated in Wards 3 and 4 (69.9% and 76.8%). It is only in 
Ward 2 that the Black Africans outnumber Coloureds2 (BVM 2011: 89-119). 
When it comes to education the town has 17% of people with no schooling; 
35.6% have some primary schooling; 11% have only primary schooling; 23.4% have 
secondary schooling, 9.1% have reached grade 12, and only 3.5% proceeded to higher 
education in 2011. The differences in levels of education between the wards are not 
very big (<10%)3 (BVM 2011: 89-119). In all three wards most people fall into the 
category “some primary schooling”. Ward 4 has a higher percentage of people with 
“higher education” than the two other wards. These numbers tell us that 86.9% of 
people in De Doorns do not even have Grade 12, which illustrates the low levels of 
education in the area. Furthermore, in 2007 only 67,7% of people in the Breede 
Valley Municipality were literate 4 (BVM 2013: 12). 
 
3.2.3 Economy and employment 
Agriculture forms the major part of the economy. Farming consists mainly of growing 
export-quality table grapes. This area is responsible for 90% of the total national 
supply.  It is a big international exporter with a history dating from 1882 (BVM 2011: 
102 & Tourism Cape Town 2014). Since the region has a long history of farming 
grapes this has become part of the inhabitants’ traditional lifestyle or culture. This 
lifestyle has been passed on from generation to generation, and few changes have 
been made to the practices or to the relationship between worker and employer. The 
farm owners are predominantly white and the farm workers are predominantly 
coloured. Farms and farm work have been handed down through the generations 
(Robb & Davis 2009: 10). In the Breede Valley Municipality agriculture is 
responsible for 28.8% of employment, followed by community services with 21.9% 
                                                
2 In Ward 2 (the eastern ward) the population is 52.6% black African, 42.8% coloured, 0% 
Indian/Asian and 4.4% white. In Ward 3 (the Northern ward, on both sides of the railway line) the 
population is 24% black African, 69.9% coloured, 0.08% Indian/Asian and 5.8% white. In Ward 4 (the 
western area and town centre) the population is 14.1% black African, 76.8% Coloured, 0.05% 
Indian/Asian and 8.9% white (BVM 2011: 89-119). 
3 In Ward 2 14.3% have no schooling, 31.4% have some primary schooling, 11.5% have primary 
schooling, 29.5% have secondary schooling, 10.4% have grade 12 and 2.5% have higher education. In 
Ward 3 22% have no schooling, 38.6% have some primary schooling, 11.5% have completed primary 
school, 18.8% have secondary schooling, 6% have grade 12 and 2.8% have higher education. In Ward 
4 15.5% have no schooling, 36.9% have some primary schooling, 10.2% have completed primary 
school, 21.8% have secondary schooling, 10.2% have grade 12 and 5.1% have higher education (BVM 
2011: 89-119).  
4 A literate person is here defined as someone who is14 years or older and has completed seven years 
of formal education (BVM 2013:12). 
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(BVM 2012: 41-2). It can be expected that the number for agriculture would be higher 
in De Doorns, given its reliance on table grape farming. The businesses in De Doorns 
are mainly on a small scale. The little business that does exist in town has as its 
customers the surrounding farming community. There are also mixed-use type 
developments in town to try to integrate the lower-income eastern part of town with 
the other more affluent parts (BVM 2011: 90). 
The increase in labour demand in the Hex River Valley and the demise of 
apartheid led to an increase of migration into the area from 1992 onwards. These 
initial immigrants came from the Eastern Cape, Lesotho and the Free State; the first 
Zimbabweans came later, in 2002 (Robb & Davis 2009: 10-11). 
According to the Integrated Development Report in 2007 of the Cape 
Winelands District, De Doorns is a district with one of the highest unemployment 
rates in the area (Robb & Davis 2009: 125). It has an economically thriving, wealth-
creating deciduous fruit agricultural economy, but this is in contrast to the poverty 
found in De Doorns. Farming is one of the lowest paid labour sectors, with a 
minimum wage of R6.31 an hour at the time of the xenophobic events in 2009 
(PASSOP 2010, Robb & Davis 2009: 10). However the minimum wage for farming 
has increased to R12.41 in 2014 (SA 2014).  In 2011 De Doorns had an 
unemployment rate of 9.4%, while 25.6% were “not economically active”6 and 64.8 
% were employed. However there are significant differences between the wards. In 
Ward 2 only 43.2% of the people were employed while the figure for Ward 3 was 
77.9% and that for Ward 4 73.2% (BVM 2011: 89-119). This illustrates the 
differences that exist in the town. It was in the economically challenged Ward 2 that 
the xenophobic attacks started in 2009.  
 
3.2.4 Living quarters: conditions 
In the 90s there was an increase in forced evictions from the farms, which is where the 
workers traditionally stayed. The decreasing on-farm living quarters and the 
increasing migration (due to a higher demand for labour) contributed to the growth of 
the population in town (Robb & Davis 2009:10). De Doorns quickly developed a 
                                                
5 This report is no longer available online. 
6 Note that ‘economically active’ is defined by Statistics South Africa as follows: “A person who is not 
working and not seeking work or not available for work is classified as not economically active. This 
group includes full-time students, housewives, the disabled who cannot work, retired people and others 
who cannot work. Again the term is only officially applied to those of working age, 15 to 65.” 
(Statistics South Africa 2014b). 
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significant poor rural informal settlement. This settlement helped to meet the growing 
seasonal need for the farm workers. Housing is divided according to ethnicity, one of 
the effects of the categorization of labour and the policies of the past. However, 
despite the deep ethnic divisions that are evident geographically between Xhosa, 
Coloured and Basotho people there is no evidence of a concern for the potential for 
violent conflict between them (Robb & Davis 2009: 11). The public facilities 
available in town include a clinic, primary schools, churches, a police station, sports 
fields, public open spaces and a golf course (BVM 2011: 90). 
In De Doorns as a whole 79.9% of households occupy formal housing, 18.9% 
occupy informal housing while 1% occupy traditional housing (in 2011). There are 
significant differences between the wards. Of the households that occupy informal 
dwellings, 81.6% live in Ward 2. In this poorer ward only 45.9% of people live in 
formal dwellings while 53.1% live in informal dwellings and 0.8% live in traditional 
dwellings. In Ward 3, on the other hand, nobody lives in an informal dwelling, and in 
Ward 4 only 2.5% live in informal dwellings (BVM 2011: 89-119). 
In 2009 there was a housing backlog that (at the then current pace) would take 
21 years to meet. Since this calculation does not take into account future population 
growth, the backlog is in reality much greater than 21 years. In 2009 there were 4000 
applicants waiting for Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) housing, though 
only 600 units were planned for De Doorns (Robb & Davis 2009: 12). Those families 
that are approved for the housing are allocated a piece of land on which their house is 
going to be built. These families are allowed to erect a temporary dwelling on that 
plot of land, leaving space to build the house in front of the temporary structure. 
However this land belongs to the municipality, so if the land is vacated it reverts to 
the municipality; this means that this land can never be sold, legally. It is also 
stipulated that RDP housing is not to be leased out to other tenants, and that no other 
dwellings are to be built on the land. In 2009 there were 3400 families that were living 
in surrounding informal settlements, none of whom had tenure rights. This number 
did not include South Africans not listed for RDP housing, nor did it include the non-
nationals who did not have the proper status to apply for housing (Robb & Davis 
2009: 12).  
More that 20% of families only have one or two rooms in their shack. These 
cramped living conditions become even worse during the grape season when many 
more have to be accommodated in the already limited space (Robb & Davis 2009: 
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12). In the poorer Ward 2, only 32.6% off people have access to water inside their 
dwelling; 22.9% have to walk more than 200m to get water at a communal tap. In the 
other two wards only 2.6% (Ward 3) and 2% (Ward 4) of the households must walk 
more than 200m to get water (BVM 2011: 89-119). When looking at energy used for 
lighting, in Ward 2 only 42.4% use electricity for this purpose, while 22.6% still use 
candles (BVM 2011: 95). Moreover the low wages and the seasonal work means that 
people’s lives are uncertain and unsafe. The people living in these poor conditions are 
exclusively people who belonged to the apartheid “underclass”, people that was 
suppressed during the apartheid rule in South Africa (Robb and Davis 2009: 12).   
 
3.2.5 De Doorns’ migrant population 
The De Doorns migrant population has predominantly come from Zimbabwe. The 
first Zimbabweans started arriving in De Doorns in 2002. This was in response to the 
expanding industry and growing demand for labour. This first small group consisted 
of family and friends and was hired by an established farmer. They lived ‘in town’ 
next to the locals. As a consequence of the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe, South 
Africa became an increasingly popular refuge, being a neighbouring country and part 
of the South African Development Community (Robb & Davis 2009: 11). 
  There are several ‘push’ factors that explain the presence of Zimbabweans. 
These factors include political persecution and extreme economic hardship. Human 
Rights Watch (2008) reported that in 2007 83% of Zimbabweans lived below the 
poverty line and 80% were unemployed. This did not improve with the economic 
collapse in 2008 (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 46). In addition the health care 
institutions were failing with 50% of healthcare positions vacant. Life expectancy had 
dropped dramatically: for women it had fallen from 56 years in 1978 to 34 years in 
2006, a drop of 22 years (Human Rights Watch 2008).  52% of the Zimbabweans in 
De Doorns say they were displaced by Operation Murambatsvina. In this operation 
the government of Zimbabwe conducted a demolition operation that displaced 500 
000 residents in 2005. Another ‘push’ factor is the violence within the country 
(Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 46). The situation in Zimbabwe was so bad that 
xenophobia would not necessarily discourage migration to South Africa (Robb & 
Davis 2009: 11). 
The Zimbabweans fall within the age group 20 to 39 years. Half were married: 
52% of the men and 46% of the women; in addition 8% of the women were widows. 
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75% of the women and 48% of the men had children, but only 13% of these children 
were living with their parents in De Doorns (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 43).   
Most of the Zimbabweans in De Doorns are over-qualified for the work they 
are doing. 74% of the migrants have an urban background, and only 4% had worked 
in agriculture before. Only 15% had experience with work involving some kind of 
physical labour (including agricultural work); while 46% were previously engaged in 
formal non-labour-intensive work.  When it comes to education, the Zimbabweans 
had rather high levels of schooling. 15% had “A” levels, a university degree or 
diploma; 74% had “0” levels or less; only 11% had 9 years of schooling or less. The 
majority of the Zimbabweans in De Doorns (87%) had the status of asylum seekers; 
5% had received full refugee status while 2% had work permits. This leaves 6% of the 
migrants undocumented – these were the only ones to be working illegally (Solidarity 
Peace Trust 2010: 42). 
 Although the wages at the farms in De Doorns are within minimum limits7 the 
work is demanding: people work for long hours for a small amount of money. About 
45% of the Zimbabweans worked for 9 hours a day or less; 26% worked for up to 12 
hours a day; and 29% worked 10 or 11 hours a day. The minimum wage for a week’s 
work was R284. Nobody said they earned less than R199 a week; 5% said they were 
paid R200-299 a week – which is below the minimum wage; 86% said they earned 
R300-399; only 9% earned more than this (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 46) 
De Doorns is well known in Zimbabwe: it is described as an easy place to find 
a job and as a place where you do not need experience to get a job. Also since there 
are many Zimbabweans in De Doorns they are able to help newcomers while they 
look for work. De Doorns has become a headquarter for the migrating Zimbabweans. 
It serves both as a place to obtain jobs and also as an entry point before continuing the 
journey. Farmers come all the way from the Eastern Cape and Namibia to recruit 
workers in De Doorns (Robb & Davis 2009: 11). In 2009 13% of the Zimbabweans 
had been in South Africa for six months or less; 19% had been in the country for up to 
one year; 25% had been in the country for up to two years; and 43% had been in 
South Africa for between two and five years (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 46). By 
2009 the number of Zimbabweans in De Doorns was estimated at 2500, though this 
                                                
7 The minimum wage went from R69 a day to R105 a day in 2013 in the Hex River Valley (Coetzee 
2013).  
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number would have been greater if displaced persons had been taken into 
consideration.  
The rural town of De Doorns has become host to a large and growing number 
of migrants (Robb & Davis 2009: 11). In 2010, even after the xenophobic events, 11% 
of the Zimbabweans in De Doorns still considered this town a permanent destination. 
Another 10% thought they would stay another year. 53% believed they would move 
on in six months, as this was when the season ended. 15% were uncertain, but only 
4% wished to move on immediately (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 46).   
 
3.3 The xenophobic attacks 
3.3.1 Overview of the event 
The xenophobic attacks on 14 and 17 November 2009 were the biggest of their kind 
since the xenophobic attacks in May 2008, when 68 people were killed throughout 
South Africa (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 37). During these few days in De Doorns 
approximately 3000 foreigners (mostly Zimbabweans) were chased from their homes 
(PASSOP 2010). Basothos from Lesotho were also present in the township, but were 
not chased out because they threatened to retaliate with violence if this was attempted 
(Opperman 2014). 
The violence occurred in the informal settlements of Stofland, Ekuphumleni 
and Hassie Square, which are located in the eastern ward (Ward 2). The first attacks 
happened at night from about 2.00 a.m. on Saturday 14 November in Ekuphumleni; 
these resulted in the displacement of 68 persons. The violence intensified and on 
Tuesday 17 November it spread to the two other informal settlements. This violence 
displaced about 3000 people (Misago 2009: 3). The community ordered the 
Zimbabweans out of the informal settlement, and fearing violence and fearing for 
their own safety they fled. Their houses were destroyed and their belongings were 
looted (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 37). The employers removed some of the 
migrants to their farms; others sought refuge at the police station or fled to other 
areas. A safe site was set up within 48 hours at a local sports field (Robb & Davis 
2009: 15).  
The police reportedly did little to protect the migrants or their belongings; they 
simply transported the Zimbabweans away from the violence and did not arrest a 
single looter. The police claimed they were overwhelmed, but they had not called for 
backup after 14 November when the 68 Zimbabweans had been displaced (Solidarity 
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Peace Trust 2010: 38).  Also these were not the first events of this kind in De Doorns. 
Seven Zimbabweans had been burnt to death in their dwellings in the same area in 
February 2009 (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 37). 
Disaster Management responded, in addition to the farming community, and 
helped provide for immediate needs and accommodation. Three large tents were set 
up, and portable toilets, washing facilities and a medical tent were provided. The Red 
Cross arrived within days and provided food and distributed donations. Several NGOs 
in addition to the Department of Social Development, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) and faith-based organizations assisted these Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDP). In response to this violence a Crisis Committee was organized to coordinate 
the different relief efforts and to start the reintegration of the displaced. Some 24 
people were arrested three days after the major displacement (on 20 November) and 
were charged with public violence in relation to the attacks. These arrests angered the 
host community and this set back hopes for a ‘quick fix’ or a rapid reintegration of the 
Zimbabweans (Robb & Davis 2009: 15-16).   
The host community claimed it chased the Zimbabweans out because the 
immigrants had allegedly agreed to work for less than the minimum wage and because 
they had refused to participate in strikes to obtain higher wages (PASSOP 2010: 4). 
PASSOP (People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty) (2010: 4) also says that 
low-level politicians were behind the events in order to gain political support. They 
also claim that the mayor supported this political move and that it was implemented 
by a local councillor. The violence is also said to have been motivated by housing and 
service delivery frustrations (PASSOP 2010: 4). The community demanded that their 
service delivery concerns be immediately addressed, and were determined to keep the 
Zimbabweans out (Robb & Davis 2009: 16).   
The Internally Displaced Persons safety site, located at the local rugby field, 
was opened as a result of the violence and was not closed until 17 October 2010, 
almost a year after the initial events. Most of the IDPs who had lived in the camp 
were reintegrated back into the surrounding communities (PASSOP 2010:4).   
 
3.3.2 Actors involved in response to the xenophobic attacks 
In this study I chose to conduct key informant interviews with three organizations: 
Agri Wes-Cape, the Hex River Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) and PASSOP. 
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The first two organizations represent farmers and farmers’ interests, while the third is 
an organization that works to improve the circumstances of immigrants. All three 
were involved in responding to the xenophobic attacks in De Doorns and played 
major roles during the xenophobic events. These organizations were selected because 
they are explicitly mentioned in existing reports and literature about the events and 
because they have on-site knowledge about what happened. All three organizations 
helped open the Home Affairs Satellite Office for immigrants in De Doorns, which 
shows that they also played a role in this town prior to the xenophobic events.  
 Agri Wes-Cape represents commercial farmers in the Western Cape and is 
also a part of Agri SA, which is a nationwide organization for farmers. It works with 
policy at the municipal, provincial and national levels. Before a policy regarding 
farming is passed it will come through the Agri Wes-Cape offices so that they can 
give their response to it.  The organization also does a lot of lobbying work on behalf 
of farmers in the Western Cape (Opperman 2014). During the xenophobic events in 
De Doorns, Agri Wes-Cape came to their member association’s (the HTA’s) aid to 
help and support them in this conflict. In addition to supporting the HTA they had a 
direct link with the government departments in their efforts to try and find solutions to 
the problems that arose as a result of the xenophobic events. The organization’s 
representatives were on site during meetings and negotiated with the different parties 
in the conflict and then went back to provincial and national government to present 
them with the facts regarding the conflict. Their main focus was policy issues and 
concerns with security around De Doorns. Donations were initiated by the local 
agricultural association, the HTA (Opperman 2014) 
 The HTA is an industry-related organization; its main aim is to improve the 
industry for the table grape producer. They give information both to the buyer and the 
producer of table grapes, such as regarding what type of grapes are produced and they 
inform farmers of changes in market demands. They also relay new research on the 
farming of table grapes, and on equipment, etc. The HTA also speaks on behalf of the 
farmers on certain issues, but not on labour issues. Whenever there is something in the 
valley that needs to be communicated to the inhabitants, the HTA is often contacted to 
spread this information. They also help to lobby and take cases in the valley to a 
higher level when necessary. During the xenophobic events in 2009 both fleeing 
foreigners and the farmers turned to the HTA to ask what could be done about the 
situation. The HTA tried to rally help for the displaced persons in the immediate 
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aftermath of the displacement, and they also participated in meetings to help find a 
solution for the valley (Laubcher 2014). 
 PASSOP has a different stance from the other two organizations as they work 
more closely with immigrants rather than with the farmers. They are an organization 
that aims to unite the various working class communities. They also assist asylum 
seekers and immigrants with documentation and with day-to-day challenges. Though 
their main target group is migrants they also work with South African communities. 
During the xenophobic events they assisted in organizing provisions for the displaced 
people. They also represented the displaced as a structure elected by the displaced 
persons to negotiate on their behalf for a settlement with the municipality. This 
negotiation led to a settlement and to the closure of the camp where the displaced had 
lived for about 11 months. They also helped with the reintegration of the displaced 
persons back into De Doorns. PASSOP also had people on site during the xenophobic 
events and their aftermath (PASSOP 2014).  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has served to provide a contextual framework for the xenophobic attacks 
in De Doorns. It has given some of the town’s history, discussed its composition and 
explained how people live their lives. Further it has made public the story of the 
Zimbabweans that have been residing in De Doorns: why they came there, what they 
do there, who they are and where they intend to go. The situation in De Doorns 
throws light on the xenophobic events of November 2009. Although this is a shocking 
story from one farming town, it is this tale that my thesis revolves around. These 
events should not be relegated to history and be forgotten. We must investigate the 
who, how and why of these events so that this tale does not repeat itself in this or in 
another town.   
 This investigation will be presented in the following chapter. It will be 
interesting to see what the organizations presented in this chapter have to say about 
the causes of the xenophobic attacks and also how the divides described in this 
chapter affected the events of that November.  
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Chapter 4: Underlying Causes and Triggers: Xenophobia in 
De Doorns 
 
4.1 Introduction  
On the 17th of November 2009 Zimbabweans in the informal settlements of De 
Doorns were ordered by local communities to leave their homes. Fearing violence 
they left, resulting in about 3000 Zimbabweans being displaced. In this chapter the 
research questions presented in Chapter 1 will be answered, namely: How can the 
violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained?  Do the explanations for 
xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of xenophobia in De 
Doorns? And, are the causes of the xenophobic attacks in 2009 still evident in De 
Doorns?  
 To answer these questions I use the information obtained from personal 
interviews and combine this with the findings of four reports and an article about the 
events. I have conducted three interviews with senior representatives in three 
organisations, presented in the last chapter. These were Agri Wes-Cape with the CEO 
Carl Opperman, the Hex River Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) with the 
chairman Michael Laubscher and People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty 
(PASSOP) (with Respondent 1).  These three organizations were chosen because they 
had all worked in De Doorns prior to and during the events, and they still maintain a 
presence in the valley. The interviews were conducted as semi-structured interviews 
and this enabled explanations to come through that exceeded my expectations. The 
reports that are combined with the personal interviews are:  The Doorns Monitoring 
Report: a monitor’s manual for South African “internally displaced persons” safety 
sites published by PASSOP (2010), “Toil & Trouble. Fire Burn. Cauldron Bubble” 
Xenophobia and Civil Unrest in De Doorns, South Africa published by the Scalabrini 
Center (Robb & Davis 2010), Violence, Labour and the Displacement of 
Zimbabweans in De Doorns, Western Cape published by the Forced Migration 
Studies Programme (FMSP) (Misago 2009) and Desperate lives, twilight worlds: How 
a million Zimbabweans live without official sanction or sanctuary in South Africa 
published by the Solidarity Peace Trust (2010). In addition to these four reports I have 
also used Philippa Kerr and Kevin Durrheim’s (2013) article ‘The Dilemma of Anti-
Xenophobia Discourse on the Aftermath of Violence in De Doorns’. The combination 
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of interviews and published works gives a thorough picture of the possible 
explanations for the xenophobic events in De Doorns. To answer the question about 
the possibility of recurring xenophobia, the study leans on the interviews. This is 
because the reports were written in the aftermath of the violence and their focus was 
mainly to provide an explanation.  
 This chapter is divided into three parts, corresponding to the three questions it 
will answer. The first and main question will be divided into two parts. The first part 
will present the underlying causes for the xenophobia in De Doorns. The second part 
will focus on the specific ‘triggers’ for the xenophobic violence. The answer to the 
second question relates back to Chapter 2 and will show whether the theories 
described in that chapter can explain the xenophobic events in De Doorns. The answer 
to the third question will explore whether the underlying causes for xenophobia are 
still present in De Doorns, and if so whether similar or different triggers might recur. 
Here it will also be useful to examine the interviewed respondents’ thoughts about 
preventing further xenophobic outbreaks in South Africa in addition to presenting my 
own thoughts on this matter.   
 
4.2 How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained? 
In this section the first research question will be answered. The answer to the question 
will be divided into two parts: these examine the underlying context and conditions as 
well as the ‘triggers’.  
 
4.2.1 Underlying context and conditions 
To understand the underlying conditions that made xenophobia possible one must 
know the history of the farming culture in De Doorns, seen in the context of the 
society. There is a paternalistic relationship between employer and employee. The 
local farm discourse has an element of mutual help and joint responsibility between 
the farmer and the farm workers. However this is an asymmetrical relationship where 
the farmer could use violence to maintain his authority. The post-apartheid era saw 
the introduction of more liberal agricultural policies and pro-worker legislation, but 
the farmers’ response to this has been to employ more casualised labour and to reduce 
the number of permanent workers. This is because the farmers are unable, or 
unwilling, to give permanent workers the rights to which they are entitled. Acts like 
the Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 and Extension of Security of Tenure Act 
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(ESTA) of 1997 sought to protect the workers from being exploited by the farmers. 
However, the opposite has happened. The years after the ESTA saw a peak in the 
number of evictions from farms (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 592). It should also be noted 
that some farmers have battled to stay afloat after this restructuring, and that the 
granting of rights has made it difficult for farmers to keep on workers with these new 
labour rights. Currently the farmers in De Doorns will send a bakkie or lorry to collect 
day labourers in the townships. They will also use labour brokers to obtain the 
numbers of workers needed in the picking season. In this way the farmers are not 
responsible for the upkeep of their workers since most no longer live on their farms, 
but in the townships. In this way they have transferred the risk to the workers, as they 
no longer have to pay wages during the off-season months. This leaves the worker 
without benefits, housing or job security (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 591-593). The 
labour brokers have also paved the way for casual workers, and the employment of 
migrants ensures that the farmers will have enough workers during the harvest season. 
This has led to the growth of the informal settlements, and this creates more pressure 
on sanitation, and on the available living space in the township. These factors 
contribute to the underlying conditions that foster xenophobia.   
The reason given by most of the perpetrators of the xenophobia in De Doorns 
was economic competition; it was felt that the Zimbabweans were stealing jobs from 
South Africans (Misago 2009, Opperman 2014, Laubscher 2014). Local people felt 
they were being displaced from their historic places on the farms and from the jobs 
they were entitled to; this applied especially to coloured workers who historically 
have supplied most of the labour force. Furthermore, the local workers felt that while 
farmers had always treated them badly and let them down, now it was worse because 
“they want to put other people from other countries in our place” (Kerr & Durheim 
2013: 588-589). These were, however, perceptions rather than realities. One local 
South African said: “People are jobless here. There’s no work for me, for the 
coloureds, but for the Zimbabweans there is work” (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 588-589).  
The fact is that there were enough jobs at the time of the attacks for everyone, 
according to the farmers and other observers (Misago 2009: 8, PASSOP 2014c, 
Laubscher 2014, Opperman 2014). The around 125 farms could employ about 14 
000+ workers and since the locals were unable to fill all these jobs, outsiders were 
needed.  There were more locals employed (6595), than Zimbabweans (1558) or 
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Basotho (from Lesotho) (630). In addition these number exclude the 5337 permanent 
workers, almost all of whom were South African (Misago 2009: 8).   
The locals claimed that the farmers preferred the foreign workers because they 
were a source of cheap labour, and this would undermine their struggle for better 
wages (Misago 2009: 3, Rob & Davis 2010: 20, PASSOP 2010: 4). However both the 
Zimbabwean respondents and the farmers stated that Zimbabweans got paid the same 
as all the other workers; at the time the rate was R60 a day. In the report from FMSP 
they said that there was a suspicion that Zimbabweans might not be paid for overtime, 
though Agri Wes-Cape countered this by saying that everyone gets paid for the extra 
hours worked (Misago 2009: 9). Opperman (2014) said that the Zimbabweans were 
not paid less because of their sectoral determination and their production bonus 
system that encourages the employers to pay equal and minimum wages. Laubscher 
(2014) also explains the difficulty of paying workers differently; this is difficult 
because of the way the workers are employed on a daily basis, and are fetched by the 
trucks. He says that when the workers come in the trucks the farmer cannot tell who’s 
who: it would be practically impossible for him to pay his workers differently.  
Another allegation was that the Zimbabweans did not participate in the 
struggle for better wages and working conditions (PASSOP 2010: 4). Protest action 
was seen as an important aspect of community life and was symbolic of social 
cohesion. In De Doorns local people say that if they are conducting a strike, the 
Zimbabweans will still go to work. This they say was hurting their struggle and their 
cause: because of the Zimbabweans they were not heard by the employers (Rob & 
Davis 2010: 22). Some local respondents explained that they had attacked the 
Zimbabweans because they said they did not want to participate in a planned strike on 
November 17, and this would therefore prevent them from gaining what they wanted. 
The Zimbabwean respondents said they did not know about this strike. One informant 
said: “This is just another excuse because after chasing us, they (South African 
workers) immediately went to work; they reported for work the following day and 
there was no salary increase” (quoted in Misago 2009: 9-10).  
A sentiment that goes hand-in-hand with the accusation that foreign workers 
were stealing locals’ jobs is the claim that farmers preferred Zimbabwean workers. 
This feeling of preference for the Zimbabweans was also used as an argument to 
chase them out. The research finds that farmers experienced a difference in terms of 
work ethics between local South Africans and Zimbabweans  (PASSOP 2014c, 
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Laubscher 2014, Opperman 2014). They felt that Zimbabweans had a good work 
ethic. Some of the farmers described them as “quick learners”, “more skilled”, 
“honest”, “reliable” and “grateful” (Rob & Davis 2010: 21). Local workers were said 
to lack dedication, especially during harvest season when there was a need for 
overtime work and for working on Saturdays (Misago 2009: 8). One farmer said that 
they “don’t want to work” (quoted in Rob & Davis 2010: 21). Opperman (2014) said 
that when allegations were made against the farmers in the aftermath of the 
xenophobia that workers had been short paid, he went to talk to the people who 
claimed this. An example of an answer he had obtained was the response of one man 
who said: “I only work two out of the five days, but I need five days to live, so you 
got to give me five days”. This is evidence of a lack of dedication to the work and to 
the employer. Furthermore, according to Opperman (2014) the paying of social grants 
is playing a negative role in South Africa: often the grants do not go towards their 
intended purpose. He also mentioned that alcohol abuse was a big problem. He 
claimed that if the social grant was paid out on, for example on a Tuesday, the farmer 
would be lucky if the workers showed up for work for the next couple of days. Other 
farmers also brought up the problem of alcohol within the local workforce. Local 
workers have throughout farming history abused alcohol, as they used to be paid in 
wine, bread and tobacco. The farmers’ response to these vulnerabilities was to widen 
the labour pool rather than to tackle the problems with their existing workers. This 
created further alienation and widened the power differential between employer and 
workers, thereby creating more antogonism towards the (supposedly) preferred 
Zimbabweans (Rob & Davis 2010: 21). 
Laubscher (2014) stated in the interview that he would prefer to use local 
South Africans on his farm, but if they do not arrive for work he does not have a 
choice. He will send his truck to the township and bring back the number of workers 
needed (Laubscher 2014). Laubscher also said that during the xenophobic events, in a 
meeting with the different parties to the conflict, it was claimed that Zimbabweans 
were stealing peoples’ jobs. This made him very curious to find out who these people 
were. He suggested at the meeting that the unemployed people whose jobs had been 
stolen should meet up at the taxi-rank in the mornings, rather than at the place where 
workers were usually picked up; he would tell the farmers to pick up workers from 
there first. The HTA had then advised the farmers to go to the taxi-rank first, but no 
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unemployed workers came. This further weakens the claim that Zimbabweans were 
taking local people’s jobs away.  
Another factor that made the South Africans feel the foreigners were preferred 
was the setting up of a satellite office in De Doorns by the Department of Home 
Affairs at the request of farmers and refugees. All three of the interviewed 
organisations were involved in the setting up of this satellite office (PASSOP 2014c, 
Laubscher 2014, Opperman 2014). The office was requested after complaints that 
Zimbabweans had experienced mistreatment and corruption at the Nyanga Refugee 
Reception Office. In addition there was a concern that the farmers taking the 
undocumented Zimbabweans to the office could be fined for doing so. An estimated 
12 000 Zimbabweans and 5000 Basotho was quoted as the motivation for setting up 
this office (Rob & Davis 2010: 19). In view of these obstacles the Department of 
Immigration had agreed to open a satellite office in De Doorns. However the office, 
which was supposed to deal exclusively with farm workers, also attracted other 
foreigners looking to apply for refugee papers. There was a sudden influx of these 
people into the town and tensions rose. The office received threats of arson and 
violence and these led to its closure. The office may have been short-lived but it 
contributed to and strengthened the feeling that farmers preferred Zimbabweans. This 
raised the levels of frustration in the community (Rob & Davis 2010: 20, Misago 
2009: 3).  
The role of the labour brokers in the valley was also seen as an underlying 
cause. Laubscher (2014) brings up the issue of labour brokers when responding to the 
argument that Zimbabweans are cheap labour for farmers. Labour brokers, or 
contractors, bring in extra workers for the farmers during peak season when farmers 
are themselves unable to find enough people. The farmer would pay about R5 per 
worker recruited by contractors for every day worked (Misago 2009: 9). The farmer 
would then also give the money to the contractor who then would pay the workers he 
had supplied the farmer. Laubscher (2014) reports a situation on his own farm where 
one day he suddenly found he was short of 40 people after a break. He found out that 
they left because they had been paid less than the other workers. It was the labour 
broker who had paid these workers. Laubscher says he was in shock and told the 
workers that if they came back he would pay them directly and not go through the 
labour brokers. He stopped using labour brokers after this incident. Many of the 
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farmers also stopped using these contractors for the same reason, that they had taken 
money from the workers and said that it was what the farmer paid.   
Labour brokers are critical for the supply of seasonal workers in the 
agricultural sector. It is a lucrative business that ensures that the broker is paid for 
each worker everyday. There were between 60 and 80 labour brokers in the area at the 
time. They recruited on the basis of race and nationality: Zimbabwean, Xhosa, 
Coloured, and Basotho. Zimbabwean labour brokers were more successful than the 
others, perhaps because they were favoured by the farmers, but also because it was 
especially Xhosa contractors who underpaid their workers. The Xhosa community 
reported that they had lost income due to activities of the Zimbabwean contractors, 
though they admitted that they as contractors were more affected financially than the 
Xhosa farm workers. Though, a Xhosa labour broker will obtain work for other Xhosa 
people, and thus they say their loss affects their community. So in addition to the 
ethnic divide in the valley, the use of labour brokers made locals feel unwanted 
(Misago 2009: 4-5).  
Another underlying cause for the xenophobia, it was argued in the reports, was 
government inefficiencies. The FMSP also states that failure of early warning and 
prevention mechanisms had contributed to the xenophobia (Misago 2009: 4). The 
local authorities confirm that they had been aware of the tension between South 
Africans and Zimbabwean residents and that this had become a regular occurrence. In 
February 2009 seven Zimbabweans had been burnt to death in their shacks in the 
same area. Although this was a result of an argument between a Zimbabwean and a 
Basotho, it created added tension (Laubscher 2014, PASSOP 2014c). Many 
individuals both outside and in government knew about the tensions that were 
building in the area; they knew of meetings where concrete plans of attack were being 
discussed, but no local elected or security authorities intervened to prevent these 
attacks. This was similar to the xenophobic violence  in 2008, when the government 
failed to respond to early indications that a major xenophobic event was brewing 
(Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 37). The government’s stated goal to prevent recurring 
xenophobia, especially since the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa, did not 
result in the establishment of ground level, reliable and practical mechanisms (Misago 
2009: 7).  
Local authorities’ lack of political and administrative power in relation to the 
commercial farmer was also said to be a factor that provided fertile ground for 
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xenophobia (Misago 2009: 4). A requirement of effective coordination by local 
government is that the local government institutions and officials should be 
recognized as legitimate and effective by all groups of local residents. This also 
applies to other levels of government. There were long-standing tensions in De 
Doorns which the local government was unable to resolve. It has not been seen as 
exercising legitimate authority over farming areas and was unable to resolve labour-
related tensions. If the residents feel that they cannot trust their local authorities to 
solve problems, they may turn to vigilantism and mob justice. An example of this 
problem was the satellite Home Affairs office established on private farming land and 
used by farmers and labour brokers, but without the knowledge of the local authority. 
Also it was felt that both the national government (Home Affairs) and farmers’ and 
refugee organisations were undermining the local authority (interview with Mayor 
Charles Ntsomi, cited in Misago 2009: 7). So tensions also arose from the fact that the 
local government was unable to exercise its authority.  
As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, the problems go beyond 
allegations of stealing jobs, getting paid less or not supporting strikes. The housing 
and service delivery frustrations of the local South Africans (PASSOP 2010: 4) were 
also relevant. These frustrations also get directed towards newcomers: “The only 
people that are meant to be staying in the township are the people that need a place 
and it is ‘not for business purposes’ and not for building ten shacks and making a 
business out of it,” says a leading role player of the Stofland Community, this person 
admitted to helping to organise the xenophobic violence (quoted in Rob & Davis 
2010: 23). The same person stated that only a person who possesses a SA Identity 
Document with 13 digits was to be given a piece of land in the township. The land 
was for those who were chased away from the farms and had nowhere to stay. The 
fact that the foreigners also needed a place to stay was ignored because this did not 
accord  with the perception that foreigners are not entitled to housing. The foreigners 
that live in the township are seen as taking those pieces of land away from South 
Africans. Blame is also given to the municipality, because the allocation of the houses 
was not done properly. Some locals had up to 10 shacks allocated to them; they had 
rented or sold these to Zimbabweans. This corruption was not being dealt with 
properly and this created conflict in the community (Rob & Davis 2010: 23). In other 
words, since local service delivery already was a source of social conflict, an influx of 
more people could only make things worse. When academics and politicians argue 
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that migration benefits the country, they should ask, who benefits. In De Doorns the 
farmers benefit more than the general population, and more particularly than the 
people who live in the townships. De Doorns had big poverty-related problems such 
as poor sanitation, and this is overshadowed by the possible benefits that migrants 
might bring (Rob & Davis 2010: 24). 
However, as in 2008, factors such as poverty, unemployment, the influx of 
large numbers of foreigners and poor service delivery are not adequate by themselves 
to explain the xenophobic violence. These underlying factors will create fertile 
ground, but will not trigger a xenophobic event by themselves (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 
585). To focus solely on the allegations and conditions presented in this section 
cannot justify the attacks on the Zimbabweans (Misago 2009: 3). That is why these 
explanations to the situation are only the underlying conditions. 
 
4.2.3 Triggers 
What was it that triggered the xenophobic events in De Doorns? All my respondents 
replied that these events were politically triggered (PASSOP 2014c, Laubscher 2014, 
Opperman 2014). The two days of displacement were preceded by two public 
meetings, both held at night, on 13th and 14th of November. It was at these meetings 
that a local ANC ward councillor expressed his intention to get rid of the 
Zimbabweans (Kerr & Durrheim 2013: 583). Local South Africans, local councillors, 
the mayor and police from the  Breede Valley Municipality attended the meetings, 
though they did nothing to prevent the planned chasing  out of the Zimbabweans 
(Kerr & Durrheim 2013: 586). Displaced Zimbabweans said that local councillor 
Mpumelelo “Poyi” Lubisi (Ward 2) and the then mayor of the Breede Valley 
Municipality, Charles Ntsomi, where either directly involved in organising the events, 
or were at least tolerating or indirectly supporting the events (Misago 2009: 5-6).  So 
the trigger was the ANC ward councillor who encouraged people at a meeting to 
attack the Zimbabweans the next day. However in an interview with FMSP the 
councillor denied that he had incited the violence (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 586). 
The police also played a role in this. There was an indecisive and inconsistent 
response from the police, and adds to the belief that the local authority was an 
accomplice in these events (PASSOP 2014c). During the events of the 14 November, 
when 68 Zimbabweans were displaced, the police had responded swiftly with rubber 
bullets and arrests and were able to stop the violence. However on the 17 November, 
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when almost 3000 Zimbabweans were displaced, the story was different. The police 
did not act effectively on this occasion. The police only aided Zimbabweans to leave 
the township; and did not protect their right to stay there or safeguard their 
possessions (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 38). According to witnesses, police even 
aided the perpetrators, telling them to destroy the shacks, to loot and to chase the 
Zimbabweans out – but not to beat anyone (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 38). During 
the events no arrests were made, despite the presence of the police. The following 
Thursday (19 November) 23 people were arrested. However councillor Lubisi said 
that the wrong people were arrested. Though as the findings of this research shows 
that he was an instigator I would like to argue that he probably said this for his own 
political ends. According to Lubisi the police arrested people that attended the 
meetings and were trying to find a solution, instead of arresting the hooligans. He did 
not want to help the police find the guilty persons because he believed the police 
considered him a suspect as well. The locals staged protests and collected bail money 
to secure the release of those arrested. It is uncertain whether this was because they 
regarded them as innocent or because they felt the violence was justified (Misago 
2009: 10). So all the evidence points to a local councillor, most likely Lubisi, acting 
as the political trigger. What motivated his actions?  
In the reports an argument about the role of labour brokers plays an important 
part. The reports argue that labour brokers pressured local leaders and incited local 
residents to attack and chase the Zimbabweans out. This was a turf war between rival 
labour brokers, since many labour brokers had been laid off by the farmers. It is also 
puzzling that some contractors were also local political committee members. FMSP 
believe, though stress that they do not have conclusive evidence, that labour brokers 
were directly involved in fuelling the tensions and triggering the xenophobic events, 
because there seemed to have been competition between the labour brokers (Misago 
2009: 4-5). The dishonesty among local labour brokers had led farmers to exclude 
them as middlemen, and this gave the Zimbabwean labour brokers more business. 
This provided the motivation for the xenophobia (Robb & Davis 2010: 18-19). The 
councillor reportedly gave in to demands by a powerful pressure group (the 
contractors) in order to protect his position during the upcoming local elections. This 
was because some ward committee members wanted to protect their jobs as contactors 
(Kerr & Durheim 2013: 585). The labour broker trigger is of a political nature, but in 
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the interviews conducted for this research a different emphasis was placed on a 
different motivation. 
Everything points towards the xenophobia being triggered at the night-time 
community meetings by political figures in the community. In the interviews political 
contestation within the local ANC emerges as the strongest trigger. The labour broker 
trigger was a factor, though the role of the labour brokers was not highlighted in the 
interviews.  Opperman (2014) says that he believed there was political contestation 
within the local ANC: some councillors were not getting re-elected and therefore 
started the ‘rumours’ about Zimbabweans stealing jobs, and taking less pay. 
Laubscher (2014) also stated that the ANC leaders started this ‘campaign’ against the 
Zimbabweans. Respondent 1 from PASSOP (2014c) gives a more detailed version of 
this political contestation. He explains that there was a contest for popularity with 
regard to an upcoming internal election in the local ANC. The politicians nominated 
in this internal election would be the ones standing for election in the upcoming local 
government elections in 2011. The municipality was installing electricity in the 
township, but certain areas were beneath the floodplain so electricity could not be 
installed there because it was too dangerous. One councillor, (though Respondent 1 
did not mention any name, it is most likely Lubisi (based on Misago 2009); he was up 
for re-election and was popular in the corner of the township that was beneath the 
floodplain and could not get electricity. He made a plan to displace the Zimbabweans 
so that the community he was popular in would be able to move to a higher piece of 
land were they would get electricity. By doing this he hoped to gain enough 
popularity to be re-elected. After figuring this out he called for a big public meeting 
and declared that the Zimbabweans were undermining the local labour. Respondent 1 
(PASSOP 2014c) said that he had come to De Doorns on the morning of the 17th of 
November because he had been informed of the meeting the previous night where the 
councillor had said the attacks should start from his house.   
Despite stakeholders like Agri Wes-Cape and United Nation High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also pointing to the local political actors as the 
instigators of the xenophobia in De Doorns, there was no official response by the 
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs or by any other 
institution that is charged to oversee local government. The FMSP says that this is 
only suspicion and allegations: they do not have enough evidence to prove anything, 
but they do feel this reveals the widespread mistrust of the elected officials (Misago 
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2009: 5-6). The councillor’s actions led to his suspension by the ANC (Kerr & 
Durheim 2013: 587). 
Violence against foreigners was organised and led by political individuals who 
used popular frustration to mobilize people to commit the violence (Kerr & Durheim 
2013: 585). Dislike of foreigners was used as a part of their campaign strategy to get 
re-elected. It was predicted that South Africa could expect more xenophobic attacks 
prior to the local elections in 2011 if this strategy was not abandoned (Solidarity 
Peace Trust 2010: 38). This led my respondents to claim that it in fact it was not 
xenophobia that occurred in De Doorns; the violence stemmed from the attempts of a 
politician to gain popular support (PASSOP 2014c, Laubscher 2014). Although it was 
not the underlying causes that motivated the politician to chase the Zimbabweans out, 
it was these underlying conditions that made people rally. I would argue that this 
makes the event even more xenophobic than if the Zimbabweans were really had been 
taking South Africans’ jobs, etc. This can be argued because the “real” reason for the 
xenophobic violence was not what the foreigners were in fact doing but what it was 
alleged they were doing: this was enough to chase 3000 people from their homes. 
That suggests how easy it is to stir up xenophobia and violence. Xenophobia was thus 
used as a campaign strategy. So in contrast to arguments claiming other factors lead to 
the displacement I would argue the xenophobia was real, since a particular group was 
discriminated against.  
 
4.3 Do the explanations for xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes 
and nature of xenophobia in De Doorns? 
In this section the following question is answered: Do the theories discussed (in 
Chapter 2) help to explain what happened in De Doorns? The aim is to interrogate the 
explanatory power of the theories (reviewed in Chapter 2) in an attempt to understand 
the De Doorns case. It was found that Horowitz’s (2001) theory of ethnic violence and 
Misago’s (2011) theory of micropolitics best explain the case of De Doorns, and they 
will be discussed last. However, as the other theories also have merit, they will each 
be examined briefly. All the social-cultural explanations could apply to the case of De 
Doorns. In social identity theory it is argued that a person’s self-image derives from 
the feeling that person has for the social categories he perceives himself to belong to. 
Also a person will try to enhance their own self-image, and often this is at the cost of 
another social group (Tajfel & Turner 1979:40). One of the social groups one will find 
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oneself part of is one’s nation. South Africans are still building their nationality as a 
new democracy. In De Doorns we could see that although there were ethnic divisions 
between Xhosa and Coloureds, both groups felt that they had more of a right to work 
than a foreigner, who fell outside their nation-group. The bio-cultural hypothesis says 
that it is the primordial markers that make the foreigner a target (Harris 2002); this 
can help to explain why the Zimbabweans were singled out, largely because they 
spoke a different language. Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) told of a South African 
from Limpopo who was a Shangaan; the community thought this person was a 
Zimbabwean and therefore chased him out of the township too. This story supports 
this hypothesis. The inherited culture argument may not fit well with Zimbabweans in 
South Africa, as Zimbabwe is one of South Africa’s neighbouring countries and they 
were closely connected during the apartheid era. However in the Hex River Valley the 
workers were initially only the locals, (mostly Coloured); the Zimbabweans had not 
resided in De Doorns for long. It might not have been Zimbabweans as being 
foreigners as such, but that they meant more competition for work.  
 In the structural explanation grouping all the three theories (especially 
Horowitz’s theory that is discussed later) helps to explain the case of De Doorns to 
some extent. In the relative deprivation theory it is argued that dissatisfaction is based 
on the feeling that one gets less than one feels one is entitled to; social unrest will 
occur when there is a big gap between the two (Harris 2002). This gap existed in De 
Doorns at the time of the xenophobia because the locals felt they were entitled to 
more than they were getting. Two South African respondents said, in Kerr and 
Durrheim’s research study (2013: 590): “They (the farmers) use the Zimbabweans 
against us. Zimbabwean now, it’s like a remote controller.”  And “there is not a 
xenophobia because it’s a negotiation”. By this he implied that it is the farmers that 
they are unhappy with, not the Zimbabweans: it is the farmer that is not giving them 
what they feel entitled to, while the Zimbabweans are the scapegoats. The group 
threat theory deals with the relationship between groups. It argues that the dominant 
group does not necessarily care about the other social group; what matters is the 
relation between that group and their own. Perception of members of a majority group 
that an outside group threatens their position is positively associated with prejudice 
against the out-group (King 2007). Relating to the case of De Doorns this could be 
seen in the locals feeling that the farmers were favouring the Zimbabweans, and that 
this threatened their position as the dominant group. 
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 The third and final group has to do with institutional explanations. It was 
found that the role of civil servants and the police was particularly relevant in this 
case. These institutions played a major role in triggering and enabling the xenophobic 
violence. In Chapter 2 it was argued that xenophobic statements by those in authority 
could encourage xenophobia. This was taken to another level in De Doorns, where it 
was the local councillor who instigated the violence in the first place. Furthermore, 
the police as a government agency enabled the xenophobia by not preventing it before 
and during the events that took place:  they only escorted the Zimbabweans out of the 
township.  
There were two theories that were found to provide a more satisfactory 
explanation for the xenophobia in De Doorns in November 2009. Horowitz’s theory 
of ethnic violence suggests the need to look both at external contextual causes and at 
immediate locality bound causes. This is what was found in the case of De Doorns: 
there were both underlying causes and local triggers for the events. This theory 
therefore provides a better explanation than a theory that focuses on one or the other 
aspect. Horowitz lists a number of structural factors as preconditions for communal 
violence, and these were present in the case of De Doorns. These underlying causes 
were little fear that the police will protect the victims (this could be the result of either 
inefficiency or bias), that the authorities condone the actions, the perpetrators do not 
fear reprisals from the targets of the violence and that fluctuations in government 
policies threatens the position of the instigators and could push them further down the 
social ladder (Horowitz 2001). Most of these conditions apply in the case of De 
Doorns. The police were inefficient or showed bias (no back-up was called although 
they attended the meeting that preceded the violence). The authorities condoned the 
actions, as it was the local politician who instigated the violence. The Zimbabweans 
were known to be peaceful people and thus there was no need to fear reprisals from 
them (they simply left when the local mob arrived). The fluctuations in government 
policies can have two interpretations. Firstly we can look at the farmworkers’ 
legislation (described above) and consider how it has enabled casualised work in the 
agricultural sector. Secondly we can see the situation from the local councillor’s point 
of view: he was scared that he would lose his political position and thus his social 
status and power.  
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Misago’s theory of micropolitics helps to explain the trigger in the case of De 
Doorns8. Misago argues that local political players have been active triggers for 
xenophobic violence. In the aftermath of the xenophobic violence in May 2008 he 
found that the violence had been triggered by local authorities “as an attempt to claim 
or consolidate the power and the authority needed to further their political and 
economic interests” (Misago 2011: 105).  He also found that the role players who had 
triggered the violence saw it as an effective way of gaining peoples trust, obtaining 
legitimacy and expanding their clientele base (Misago 2011: 100). In the case of De 
Doorns a political player was an active trigger for the violence. He did so to retain his 
political position in the local council. His aim was to gain popularity, thereby also 
gaining peoples trust and getting more votes. The findings of this thesis are therefore 
very compatible with Misago’s micropolitics theory, and with his explanations for the 
2008 xenophobic attacks.  
 Although the theories described in Chapter 2 all explain the events in De 
Doorns to a greater or lesser degree, I believe that no single social theory will provide 
a complete explanation. As researchers of social events and behaviour we attempt to 
get to the bottom of what happened and provide an explanation for what happened, 
based on that event alone. Nonetheless we can be assisted by theories to understand 
what took place, but we should not accept these uncritically. 
 In terms of the nature of the xenophobia the theories does not provide much of 
an explanation. The exception is Horowitz’s theory that tells that vulnerability of the 
targeted group is necessary for a violent riot. The Zimbabweans were vulnerable since 
the police did not protect them and the perpetrators did not fear retaliation from them. 
The other theories do not provide sufficient explanation for why the violence is 
targeted at black African migrants in particular. 
 
4.4 Are the underlying causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns? 
Five years having passed since the xenophobic attacks in De Doorns, and with local 
elections less than two years away, it is important to ask whether the underlying 
causes are still evident in De Doorns? Respondent 1 from PASSOP (2014c) says that 
quite a lot of housing has been provided in the area, which should help alleviate 
service delivery grievances. Furthermore Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) says that his 
                                                
8 Misago’s (2011) theory of micropolitics is further explained under the explanation of attitudes and 
behaviour of civil servants in Chapter 2 
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perception is that relations between the Zimbabweans and the locals have improved a 
lot. For example has PASSOP held a healing ceremony in De Doorns for the 
Zimbabweans killed in the fire prior to the xenophobic events of November. They 
slaughtered a sheep and organized a party. Respondent 1 also says that it is important 
to remember that the displacement of the Zimbabweans was in fact a bloodless 
displacement. (PASSOP 2014c). The respondent goes on to explain that there has not 
been any violence in the valley since the events of that November, although there has 
been crime against foreign nationals. This could be because the foreigners are more 
vulnerable, are not supported by the community, and are therefore easier targets of 
crime (PASSOP 2014c).  
 Laubscher (2014) says there will always be tension between the Zimbabweans 
and the locals. He explains that there is tension between local coloured people in the 
valley: if even people with the same cultural background experience tensions, there 
will probably also be tension with the foreigners. However Laubscher does not think 
that similar xenophobic events will recur because the people that chased the 
Zimbabweans away did not get what they aimed for. They believed that this would 
remove the Zimbabweans from De Doorns and from their lives, but this did not 
happen; the Zimbabweans stayed on the rugby field and continued to work in the 
valley. After a while the same people who instigated the violence tried to put pressure 
on the municipality to remove the Zimbabweans from the rugby field as the 
community wanted to use it for its rightful purpose. Laubscher therefore believes they 
have learnt that this path does not lead to anything fruitful and that to resolve an issue 
is not going to be that easy. 
 Opperman (2014) on the other hand has a bleaker view. When asked if he 
thought an event like this could happen in De Doorns again he said it could happen 
anywhere in South Africa if it were to be politically driven. He explains that when 
migrant workers come into township and see the opportunity to start a little enterprise, 
this creates jealousy among South Africans. The locals wonder why the foreigner is 
making money when they are not. Opperman feels there is a lack of entrepreneurial 
enterprise and pride in their work, and this could lead to ‘jealousy’ that might again 
trigger xenophobic events. He goes on to say that at the moment there are more 
people in De Doorns than De Doorns can provide work for. In other words the 
grievances against Zimbabweans when it comes to jobs has now possibly become a 
real issue in the valley, whereas before these were largely perceptions.  
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 Although a robust conclusion cannot be made based on these three interviews 
only, there is room to believe that many of the underlying conditions that were 
breeding ground for the violence may still exist in De Doorns today. These could 
provide an opportunity for self-serving and unscrupulous politicians or labour-brokers 
to trigger an event; underlying xenophobic attitudes can still be stirred and used as 
political tools. Although more houses have been built and relations have improved, 
there is still tension and the town has a larger number of people than it is able to cater 
for. This could provide for a new breeding ground for xenophobic violence, and this 
could be even worse than in 2009 since many of the Zimbabweans did not leave like 
the perpetrators wanted and were eventually reintegrated into the townships. 
 Could it happen again? The supply of electricity is no longer an issue in De 
Doorns, so this will not act as a trigger again (PASSOP 2014c). However with the 
upcoming local election in 2016 it is possible that local politicians could use 
xenophobia as a campaign strategy again if there is something to be gained from 
doing so. If there is political contestation before the local elections in 2016 we could 
see ‘xenophobia’ rising again. 
This leads to the normative questions, of what should be done to hinder 
xenophobia in the future? Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) suggests monitoring, 
stronger policing and early intervention. The monitoring, he says, should be 
conducted by civil society, by the National Intelligence Agency, by the police, by 
political parties, by religious organizations and even by NGOs. They all have a 
responsibility to ensure there is no recurrence. However, Respondent 1 (PASSOP 
2014c) says if the local politicians are sympathetic to xenophobia then this makes it 
hard to stop. Furthermore, one needs get to the heart of the problem. In De Doorns 
labour grievances were not the real issue:  the real issue was the political contestation 
between two people wanting the job of councillor and needing to gain popularity for 
their own ends.  
  Laubscher (2014) suggests that the government should improve measures to 
control undocumented foreigners. Undocumented workers can give foreigners a bad 
reputation as illegal immigrants. He also talks about the special permit9 the 
                                                
9 This was a Zimbabwean project that gave Zimbabweans an opportunity to get a special permit. The 
permits were free and could be obtained if the applicant possessed a Zimbabwean passport and a letter 
from his or her employer. Zimbabweans could live, study and work in South Africa legally with this 
permit. Even if the application for this special dispensation visa was pending, the applicant had the 
right to work, study and have access to basic health care (PASSOP 2014b). 
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Zimbabweans were given. With this special permit, which was issued free of charge, 
Zimbabweans were able to work on the farms, while the other foreign groups (such as 
people from Lesotho) needed work permits, which were much harder to obtain. This 
also created tension and a feeling that Zimbabweans were favoured.  
 Opperman (2014) argues that there needs to be a balance in the area with jobs, 
as there are not enough jobs for the people living in the valley. He also argues for a 
balance in the ethical way that we should work with one another. He calls for social 
dialogue, and specifies that this dialogue must include leaders of the community who 
want to find solutions for the community rather than to create havoc.  
  Some important questions remain. These include: why such events are a 
viable option for the people perpetrating them?  Key areas for attention include the 
documentation that immigrants need to enable them to fit into society and feel secure. 
When the Department of Home Affairs is inefficient and corrupt (so that you can buy 
your visa, or so that you must wait indefinitely for an application) this creates 
instability for immigrants and uncertainty as to how a South African should view an 
immigrant. Furthermore, there needs to be a shift in the management of work 
relations. The workers must be able to gain more job security and the farmers must be 
able to rely on their workers, thus enhancing better and more reliable productivity. To 
achieve this, legislation such as the Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 and 
ESTA of 1997 must be revisited and tailored to suit a sector such as agriculture. These 
Acts, far from helping workers, made it difficult for the farmers to offer workers 
permanent positions. The prospect of permanency could perhaps also help the work 
ethic in the sector. 
 Another important point that I would like to make in this thesis has to do with 
trying to solve problems by violent means in South Africa. Respondent 1 (PASSOP 
2014c) thinks that South Africa has a problem with violence. He explains that South 
Africa obtained its freedom through negotiations; it was not won through war. Many 
people were abused, tortured, beaten, killed and there has been retaliation. There is a 
lot of anger and frustration that still exist. There is also a big problem with mob 
justice. This respondent gives, as an example, the deportations before the xenophobia 
in 2008: the Department of Home Affairs went into the townships on immigration 
raids and arrested hundred of thousands of immigrants and deported them. Those 
immigration raids included police beating people, supported by the community 
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marching behind them. So the violence is not only carried out by township residents, 
but also by the South African Police Service.  
 The violent protests in De Doorns (and elsewhere) for the past decade have 
normalized the protest action, and violence has become a way of engaging the 
government’s attention. The xenophobic violence, and other service delivery protests, 
could be seen as a battle between the townships (like the townships of De Doorns) and 
the state. Law and order is secured by rubber bullets, guns and night-time raids. There 
is a lack of mutual respect and cooperation, human rights are not observed and 
professional ethics are not adhered to. Under such conditions a community will be 
tempted to act outside the law and ignore human rights (Robb & Davis 2010: 16-18). 
Violence, which is a non-democratic tool, has been, is and will continue to be an 
accepted tool if something fundamental is not done about the situation.  “Violence 
cannot be turned off ‘like a tap’” (Jeffery 2009: 513). This I believe is the number one 
issue that must be dealt if xenophobic attacks are to be prevented: violence must be 
taken off the table as an accepted tool for expressing one’s grievances.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided as an analysis of the causes, triggers and future prospects 
for xenophobic violence in De Doorns. The research questions that were posed in the 
first chapter have been answered through key informant interviews and an analysis of 
studies conducted in the aftermath of the xenophobia of 2009. The first question 
“How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained?” was answered 
in two parts. The first part looked at the underlying conditions that provided fertile 
ground for the xenophobic events. This part looked at perceived and at times self-
created economic contestation with the Zimbabweans. They were regarded as taking 
the jobs of locals, as accepting lesser wages and as not participating in strikes. This 
goes hand-in-hand with the perception that the farmers prefer Zimbabweans. Another 
factor was the role of the labour brokers in casualising jobs and paying the workers 
less. There were also the government inefficiencies. These included lack of an early-
warning system, bad living conditions and insecure job situations for local workers. 
However the conclusion was that these conditions were insufficient to explain the 
eruption of violence in De Doorns that November. In the next part the triggers of the 
violence were identified. The main trigger was political contestation between local 
ANC politicians who wanted to be re-elected. It was said labour brokers had 
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pressured the councillor to instigate the violence because they felt their jobs were 
threatened. From the personal interviews it emerged there was a popularity contest 
among politicians who were up for election. Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) spoke 
about an electricity issue in a corner of the township. The councillor wanted to solve 
this by displacing the Zimbabweans to make room for the locals. In this way he hoped 
to gain enough popularity to get re-elected. The clearest explanation of the 
xenophobic attacks is that what happened was the result of the politicization and 
mobilization of xenophobic attitudes with the assistance of broader underlying 
grievances. However, although the political competition was the trigger I argue that 
this was still a xenophobic event. The underlying causes were not sufficient to explain 
why the people of De Doorns chased the Zimbabweans out, but it was what made 
them rally.  
The second section answered the second research question. It looked at the 
theories from Chapter 2 to see if they provided a sufficient explanation for the causes 
and nature of the xenophobia in De Doorns.  It concluded that most of the theories 
provided only a partial explanation. It found that Horowitz’s theory of ethnic violence 
and Misago’s theory micropolitics yielded the best explanations for the events in De 
Doorns. It was also stated that generalization from a theory can supply a researcher 
with an unrealistic answer, and therefore each case must be seen in its own context. 
The theories, however, still remain insufficient for explaining the nature of 
xenophobia: why black African migrants and why violent? 
 The third section answered the third question posed in the introductory 
chapter:  Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns? In this section I 
found that although the problem  of electricity has been resolved, the society was still 
poor and with an excess of people and not enough  jobs. Thus if there is political 
contestation before the local elections in 2016 we could again see the rise of 
‘xenophobia’, either in De Doorns or in other towns where similar conditions are 
present. Nevertheless, such a town must be seen in its own context. In this section 
some suggestions were offered on how xenophobia should be prevented in the future. 
These were: 
• Monitoring and early intervention 
• Controlling undocumented migrants 
• Balance in jobs- reducing unemployment 
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• Mutual appreciation and respect between employee and employer and 
encouraging a good work ethic for both sides 
• Stopping violence as a means of voicing one’s grievances  
I especially emphasize that the last point: stopping violence, which characterises 
xenophobia in South Africa, as an option is something that South Africa must address. 
Violence, as a means to an end is unacceptable in a democratic dispensation. After a 
long liberation war and after decades of violent protest, violence has become a first 
resort for many marginalized South Africans; this is the only way they feel that they 
can be heard. If this problem were to be properly addressed, this would not only 
prevent xenophobia, but also prevent other hate crimes and violent strikes.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present the results of this Master’s thesis, and present what has been 
accomplished. It will start off with an overview of the previous chapters, summarizing 
them and showing how they work as building blocks. Secondly, following the 
overview of the first three chapters, a summary of the findings of Chapter 4 will be 
presented. From there the conclusions that are drawn from this research will be set 
out. Then it will point out the contributions of this study and finally it will give 
suggestions for further research. 
 
5.2 Thesis overview 
Chapter 1 served as the introduction to the thesis. It gave the rationale for the thesis, 
presented the topic and the rationale for the case study; it also stated the research 
questions and described the research design and methodology that were to be used. 
The aim of the thesis was to explore the explanations for the violent xenophobia in 
South Africa. It presented the South African Human Rights Commission’s (SAHRC) 
definition of xenophobia, which is “the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a 
recipient state” (in Bekker 2010: 127). This was followed by the notion that it is 
important to understand that xenophobia goes beyond just an attitude towards 
foreigners; it also finds expression as a practice when these attitudes result in violent 
behaviour (Harris 2002). A background of xenophobic events that have taken place in 
South Africa was presented to show the severity of this phenomenon in the country.  
 The objective of the thesis was described: the aim was to try and find out why 
xenophobia happens and why it is so violent, thus violating the liberal South African 
constitution and its Bill of Rights. The empirical research was limited to a case study 
of the xenophobic events in the rural agricultural town of De Doorns in November 
2009, when 3000 Zimbabweans were chased out of their homes, which were 
subsequently looted and destroyed. The research was guided by the following three 
research questions:  
1) How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained? 
2) Do the explanations for xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the 
causes and nature of xenophobia in De Doorns? 
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3) Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns? 
This thesis’s descriptive and exploratory study is based on a single case, De 
Doorns, using a qualitative design. It set out to investigate the research questions by 
undertaking text analysis of four key reports (PASSOP 2010, Rob & Davis 2009, 
Misago 2009, Solidarity Peace Trust (2010)) and an article (Kerr and Durheim 2013) 
on the xenophobia in De Doorns and by referring to key informant interviews. Three 
organizations played major roles before, during and after the xenophobic events took 
place: these were Agri-Wes Cape, the Hex River Valley Table Grapes Association 
(HTA) and People against Suffering Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP).  
 Chapter 2 reviewed the different theories that try to explain xenophobia, with 
a focus on South Africa. In addition it looked at the nature of xenophobia. The 
theories were divided into three groupings: these were the socio-cultural, the 
structural and the institutional explanations. The first grouping  (socio-cultural 
explanations) comprises three theories: social identity theory; the bio-cultural 
hypothesis; and the inherited culture theory. These explanations lean on social and 
cultural factors to explain the xenophobia occurring in South Africa. The second 
grouping (structural explanations) includes the relative deprivation theory, the theory 
of ethnic violence and the group threat theory. This grouping looks at the structural 
aspect of society and at the socio-economic context to see how this can create 
conditions conducive to xenophobia. The last grouping (institutional explanations) 
looks at the attitudes of and at the conduct of civil servants as well as state institutions 
when it comes to addressing or even creating xenophobia. The chapter also 
investigated explanations at a local level. It also looked at the gap between the state’s 
policy on migration and its implementation. Lastly this grouping looks at state 
agencies, in other words at how the police behave and at how South Africa detains  
foreigners. It was pointed out that what a state does or signals can have a big impact 
on what goes on in a country; in this way state-centred explanations could help to 
explain the prevalence of  xenophobia.  
 This chapter then looked at the nature of xenophobia. It was found that 
xenophobia consists of both attitudes and behaviour. Xenophobic attitudes are those 
that are held against a group of people solely on the basis of this group’s other 
nationality. Xenophobic behaviour consists of physical acts directed towards a group, 
again solely because members of this group belong to another nationality. The chapter 
also points out that xenophobic behaviour has often turned violent on many occasions 
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in South Africa, and this is what makes it such a grave problem. This section also 
addressed the fact that it is black African foreigners that are the target of xenophobic 
violence. This  was explained by the proximity of this foreigner group to the 
townships, where the violence mostly occurs. It is also black African foreigners that 
the perpetrators feel they are in competition with: they feel that these foreigners are a 
threat. This chapter concluded that all of the explanations help to throw light on the 
xenophobia to a certain extent – and they are not mutually exclusive.  
 Chapter 3 was primarily  descriptive. It summarised the history of De Doorns. 
It then looked at the composition of the town, its social economy, its service delivery, 
problems with employment, etc. The history explains how the town of De Doorns 
became the centre of the table grape exporting industry in the Hex River Valley. The 
valley is responsible for 90% of the total national supply of table grapes (Breede 
Valley Municipality (BVM) 2011: 102), and this is the major source of employment 
in the valley. It was revealed that the poorer ward (Ward 2) had the highest percentage 
of informal settlements and its residents had furthest to go for water, to mention some 
examples. This was also the ward where the xenophobia arose.  
 The chapter also presented information about the migrant population of De 
Doorns. It explained that the migrants were predominantly from the neighbouring 
country of Zimbabwe, although there was also a smaller group of Basothos from 
Lesotho. It was only the Zimbabweans that were targeted during the xenophobic 
violence. The Zimbabweans only started to arrive in the valley from 2002 (Robb & 
Davis 2009: 11). There were many ‘push factors’ to explain why the Zimbabweans 
decided to leave their country, such as political persecution and extreme economic 
hardship. This section explained that the rural town of De Doorns has become host to 
a large and growing number of migrants (Robb & Davis 2009: 11). 
Lastly, in this chapter the xenophobic events were described. On the 15th and 
17th of November in 2009 the Zimbabwean community was forcefully chased from 
the informal settlement; as the Zimbabweans fled, their homes where torn down, 
burned and destroyed. This led to 3000 people being displaced; they sought refuge 
either on the farms of their employers or at the shelter erected on the local rugby field, 
this camp was closed after 11 months (Kerr & Durrheim 2013: 583-584). This section 
also discussed the three organisations that were interviewed for this thesis. These were  
Agri-Wes Cape, which is a farmers’ organisation operating at a provincial level, the 
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HTA, which is a local farmers’ organisation in the Hex River Valley, and PASSOP 
which is an organisation that fights for refugees’ rights in South Africa.  
Chapter 4 presented and analysed the empirical research and this will be 
summarised in the next section. 
 
5.3 Summary of Findings 
This section will serve as a summary of the findings in Chapter 4; these are presented 
in relation to the research questions. The first question asked how the violent 
xenophobic attacks in De Doorns could be explained. This question was answered in 
twofold. Firstly there were the underlying conditions that were necessary for 
xenophobia to develop and erupt in November 2009. The context of the agricultural 
scene in South Africa has to be taken into account. This is a history of the exploitation 
of workers and also of the failure of legislation to improve the situation of farm 
workers. The farming sector has become an employer of casual workers and has been 
characterised by lack of job security, one of the unintended consequences of 
legislation relating to farm workers (see the Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 
and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) of 1997). The underlying causes 
were identified as: firstly, local frustrations with and perceptions of the Zimbabweans 
that led to xenophobic attitudes in the South African residents of De Doorns. There 
was a general belief  that Zimbabweans were taking jobs away from South Africans, 
leading to high levels of  unemployment. There was also a belief that the 
Zimbabweans were accepting less pay from the farmers and undermining the farm 
workers’ long struggle for higher wages. The locals felt that the Zimbabweans were 
preferred by the farmers. Evidence of this was the setting up of a Home Affairs 
satellite office to help the foreign workers obtain the necessary papers. Furthermore, 
the South Africans believed that the Zimbabweans would undermine their efforts to 
improve their work situation by breaking strikes and going to work. The second set of 
underlying causes was the presence of labour brokers, which encouraged the belief 
that Zimbabweans were accepting less money because some of the labour brokers 
were deducting money from their pay. Their services also encouraged the 
employment of casual labour. Another of the underlying causes was related to 
government inefficiencies, including the lack of an early-warning system and poor 
service delivery. These underlying conditions were, however, insufficient to explain 
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the nature of the xenophobia: why did this turn into violent behaviour targeting the 
Zimbabwean community? 
 The above-mentioned conditions help to explain why the xenophobia could 
progress from xenophobic attitudes to xenophobic behaviour. The eventual 
displacement of the 3000 Zimbabweans, was a result of specific triggers. These 
triggers were found through the research to be of a political character. From the 
reports there were also strong arguments about the labour brokers’ role. Since many 
of the labour brokers had been laid off by the farmers, because of paying some of the 
workers less, they wanted to create a higher demand for workers in the valley. The 
reports described the way they put pressure on a local politician who was up for re-
election to get the Zimbabweans to move out so that their services would be needed 
again; in return the politician would be re-elected. Instead, from my interviews it 
emerged that there was political contestation within the ANC: a local councillor was 
stirring the pot of xenophobia to gain popularity. Through my PASSOP (2014c) 
interview it emerged that the councillor had wanted the Zimbabweans out so that his 
section of the township could move to higher ground where electricity was installed; 
in this way he would gain the popularity needed for re-election. In other words local 
political role-players triggered the xenophobia. 
The second question asked whether the theories (presented in Chapter 2) could 
offer sufficient explanation of the causes and nature of the xenophobia in De Doorns. 
The theories in Chapter 2 all offered some explanation for the xenophobic attacks in 
De Doorns in November 2009, but two of the theories were emphasized in Chapter 4; 
these were Horowitz’s theory of ethnic violence and Misago’s micropolitical 
explanation . The theory of ethnic violence explained the case more convincingly 
because it argues that both external contextual causes and immediate locallity-bound 
causes need to be considered when looking at violent outbursts (Horowitz 2001). Thus 
this theory takes into consideration the two-fold answer found by the research into 
underlying conditions and triggers. In his research of the May 2008 xenophobia, 
Misago argues that the violence was organized and led by local political players. He 
also states that this was “as an attempt to claim or consolidate the power and the 
authority needed to further their political and economic interests” (Misago 2011: 105). 
This scenario also applied to De Doorns during the xenophobic attacks. However it 
was stated that all cases must be viewed in their own local context, and not solely on 
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the basis of a theory: otherwise one can easily find what one wishes to find, rather 
than uncovering the real answer. 
 The third question asked if the causes for xenophobia were still evident in De 
Doorns. There is reason to believe that many of the underlying conditions (now there 
is not enough jobs for everyone in the valley, casual work, the presence of a large 
group of migrants, poor living conditions) still exist in De Doorns; these provided a 
breeding ground for exploitation by self-serving and unscrupulous politicians. If the 
‘right’ triggers are present the violence could happen again. On the other hand, the 
residents of the town of De Doorns saw that the Zimbabweans did not leave town: 
they stayed on the rugby field and continued working in De Doorns, thus chasing 
them did not solve the (perceived) ‘problem’ of the Zimbabweans. Also the electricity 
has now been installed in the township.   
 
5.4 Conclusions 
First one should reflect on the research design and method. Choosing a qualitative 
study turned out well, as this was a single case and this provided the depth and detail 
that made it possible to answer the research questions. Choosing a combination of text 
analysis and key informant interviews gave a balanced and comprehensive overview 
of the xenophobia in De Doorns. It was balanced in that the interviews were both 
from farmers’ organisations and also from an organisation supporting refugees. In 
addition the text analysis yielded insights into both the perpetrators and the displaced 
Zimbabweans (something that was not possible in this research because of issues 
concerning security and language). Obtaining the interviews was not as difficult as 
had been feared: the selected organisations were forthcoming and very willing to 
assist with the research. The choice of the organisations was appropriate as all the 
respondents had good knowledge about the events and therefore were able to be of 
significant assistance.  
The conclusions of this research closely resemble the findings described in the 
previous section, especially with regard to questions 1 and 2, which are of an 
explanatory nature. The conclusion with regard to the first research question, “How 
can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained?” is that underlying 
conditions in the Hex River Valley made it possible for a local politician to stir up 
xenophobic sentiments and direct local people to chasing the Zimbabweans out of the 
valley. He did this for personal political gain; the aim was to be re-elected in the 
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internal election for the local ANC. Thus xenophobic attitudes among the people of 
De Doorns made it possible for this political role player to act as a trigger. The 
conclusion regarding question 2, “Do the theories, as presented in chapter 2, offer 
sufficient explanation for the xenophobia in De Doorns?”, also mirrors the findings; 
the theory of ethnic violence and Misago’s theory of micropolitics were best able to  
explain the case of De Doorns. Although no single theory will be able to fully explain 
an event or a phenomenon, it is important conduct case studies (like this one) to 
explain what really took place.  
The third research question, “Are the underlying causes for xenophobia still 
evident in De Doorns?”, is of a exploratory nature. In the findings it was explained 
that the underlying conditions are still evident in De Doorns. On the other hand it 
seems unlikely that the same violence will recur because the recollection of what 
happened in 2009 is still fresh, and because the Zimbabweans in fact stayed in the 
valley. What is interesting is that these conditions can be found in other places in 
South Africa, thus, given the right ‘triggers’, one might expect further xenophobic 
outbreaks. The major concern is that this could mean that migrants are particularly 
vulnerable at key political moments, such as at election time. The period around the 
upcoming local elections of 2016 could potentially become another flashpoint, should 
political opportunists seek to exploit migrants’ vulnerability for their own political 
ends. 
 
5.5 Summary of contributions 
The first contribution of this thesis is that its empirical research has contributed 
towards validating the theoretical explanations. It has shown that there is a need not 
just to look for underlying causes or just for ‘triggers’ of xenophobic violence: To be 
able to paint the whole picture these events both need to be researched to arrive at a 
fuller explanation. A theory like Horowitz’s theory of ethnic violence will give a more 
precise and fuller picture than, for example, the relative deprivation theory, as the 
latter theory looks more at underlying causes and does not take ‘triggers’ into 
consideration. However this does not mean that theories like the relative deprivation 
theory do not have explanatory value; rather it means that they offer a partial 
explanation. In general, the empirical research (the case study) has enhanced  the 
explanatory value and relevance of the current explanations and theories.  
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 The second contribution this thesis presents comes from its examination of the 
xenophobic events in De Doorns five years after they had occurred. This enabled the 
researcher to decide whether this could be a recurring phenomenon in the valley. It 
was found that there had been no recurrence of any comparable xenophobic 
behaviour. However it was found that such events could recur in communities with 
similar and/or heightened underlying causes with the ‘right’ triggers; this was liable to 
happen at election time. It shows that local role players can play a crucial role in 
stirring up social unrest at the time of local elections. In this case it was an internal 
campaign within a political party that led to the violence, rather than competition 
between different political parties.  
 The practical implication of the study is that local authorities’ role in 
xenophobia needs to be addressed. I would argue that this applies to informal 
authorities (non-elected authorities) as well as to political role players. The sentiment 
embodied in the South African Constitution, built on human rights, is that xenophobia 
is wrong and thus should be stopped in its tracks. Consequently when authority 
figures are the triggers of these outbreaks their role and influence must be checked; 
elected officials are to be the representatives of the state at the local level.    
 
5.6 Suggestions for further research 
Since this research was limited to the case of De Doorns, further research could be 
conducted at other locations to see if the triggers found here occur elsewhere. A 
nation-wide study would enable its results to be generalised on a national level; such a 
study might make further recommendations for solving the problem of xenophobia. 
This research could subsequently put forward suggestions for targeted policy making 
and processes.  
Another suggestion would be to compare the causes and triggers of the service 
delivery protests that are taking place throughout South Africa with similar violent 
nature, with the causes and explanations for the xenophobic attacks to see if there are 
any correlations.   
In addition an international comparison could be possible. To take such  
research to an international level would allow the researchers  to determine  if similar 
xenophobic incidences  have occurred and if so how to investigate if the causes are 
similar or not and to analyse policy responses.  
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